Report of the Working Group on Securing Card Present Transaction - ربی - Reserve Bank of India
Report of the Working Group on Securing Card Present Transaction
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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL June 2, 2011 Chairperson Smt. Shyamala Gopinath, Madam, We have great pleasure in submitting the Report of the Working Group appointed by RBI vide Memorandum dated March 11, 2011 for recommending an action plan for implementation of additional authentication for all card present transactions. The approach adopted by the Working Group was to review the existing payment infrastructure in the country, study global experience of such efforts and suggest steps to further secure the payment infrastructure. The committee based on the study of the best practices, global case studies, new developments in the payments infrastructure and related domains has arrived at a set of final recommendations. The recommendations cover elements to strengthen the payment infrastructure, in addition to solutions for securing the plastic form factor and introducing additional authentication of all card present transactions. Critical aspects like cost of migration, customer convenience, global interoperability and technology / the system requirements were considerations while arriving at the overall approach. Over the last 8 weeks, the participants of the working group have deliberated in great detail and this report is the outcome of these discussions. The group has actively solicited inputs from stakeholders with experience either locally or globally on the same including technology providers, UIDAI. The report takes into account the views and recommendations of all the participants. On behalf of the members of the Working Group and on my own behalf, I sincerely thank you for entrusting this responsibility to us.
Working Group for recommending action plan for implementation of additional authentication for all Card Present transactions
The working group would like to acknowledge the contributions of the following groups and individuals: 1. Mike Hendry (Payment Systems Consultant) for sharing his personal experience and learnings from his global assignments 2. Stakeholders from various companies in this space for their time and sharing their experiences / understanding - Harpal Singh, Verifone India; Rajesh Bansal, UIDAI; Amit Kakatikar Oberthur India 3. The VISA Asia Pacific team – Murugesh Krishnan and Manoj Sugathan for their valuable inputs on global case studies, managing large scale migrations and fraud trends 4. Representatives from Axis Bank who though not in the formal working group, joined the discussions and actively participated 5. Certain representatives from the participating banks deserve special mention:
6. Last but certainly not the least, Shri G Padmanabhan, RBI for his direction, guidance and in clearly setting the focus for the group. Special thanks to K Sivaraman and K Vijaykumar from RBI for their support
Card Present Transactions (transactions at POS and ATMs) constitute the major proportion of card based transactions in the country. Currently, transactions using cards at POS do not require additional authentication in majority of the cards. Further, data stored in magnetic stripe is vulnerable to skimming. Increasing confidence of the customer for using POS channel would require securing of these transactions through implementation of authentication in the short run and prevent counterfeiting of cards by migrating to chip and PIN in the long run. Considering the importance of this process, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has constituted the Working Group with the following terms of reference: i. To examine all aspects related to use of cards at POS and ATMs and recommend action plan for enabling, additional authentication of transaction using existing cards in a cost effective manner. The plan should enable implementation of the process within 6 months. ii. To examine the merchant enrollment and monitoring process currently in practice from fraud vulnerability perspective and recommend measures to address these risks. iii. To examine the cost aspect associated for migrating the infrastructure for enabling issuance and acceptance of Chip and Pin cards, and recommend a migration plan with specific timeframe for migrating all components associated. The plan should enable complete migration within 3 years. The Working Group examined the following aspects as part of the process to arrive at the final recommendation: 1. Existing payments infrastructure in the country 2. Solutions available to secure Card Present transactions and prevent skimming (covering both current mass adopted technologies and emerging technologies) 3. Solutions were evaluated across multiple dimensions including: Customer experience, Execution challenges, Business Challenges, Costs 4. Experiences in other markets 5. Inputs from other partners / service providers the ecosystem 6. Residual risks and new risks which emerge based on the final recommendation were understood and tabled – mitigants to manage the same also presented Industry Size The industry size (defined as total credit and debit card spends value) is approximately Rs. 1,13,000 crores (includes ecommerce, IVR, MOTO transactions from Mar ‟10 to Feb „11). The total credit and debit card POS spends value is Rs. 88,000 crores. ATM cash withdrawals are Rs. 10,91,115 crores. The number of debit cards is 24 crores and the number of credit cards is 1.8 crores. The total number of POS terminals is 5.6 lakhs and the number of ATMs is 70,000. Figures as of Feb ‘11 (Refer APPENDIX A for more details) Point of Sale (POS) - Fraud Levels In the context of terms of reference, two categories of frauds are relevant: Lost & Stolen card fraud and Counterfeit card fraud. The total industry lost & stolen and counterfeit card fraud is Rs. 13 crores. The fraud to sales ratio is approximately 1.4 basis points (bps). However, a trend in counterfeit card fraud is that counterfeiting typically happens when customers travel internationally. The POS fraud summary details are as below:
Note: Data is industry-wide annual fraud data. The frauds numbers are based on the numbers reported by banks to Visa and MasterCard.
ATM - Fraud Levels Currently, banks separately report credit and debit card frauds. However, channelwise classification is not available. While the current fraud levels are low, the following considerations emerge: 1. Early cases of domestic counterfeit and skimming are being observed. Currently, Counterfeit fraud is more prevalent internationally. 2. Strong case to treat domestic and international spends differently (Table 2B) Magnetic Stripe Card Countries USA & China: USA and China are two examples of large countries that continue to issue magnetic stripe cards. In the US, the resistance to change stems primarily due to two reasons: Cost of migration to EMV as profitable revenue channels associated with current interchange fees do not offset the cost of recarding. China has strong legal framework to handle financial frauds, which acts as a deterrent to fraudsters. EMV Chip Card Countries Regulatory Mandate Most countries have migrated to chip card or chip card & PIN based on regulatory mandate. Europe: Initial migration to chip cards in Europe took place to address high communication cost. Over time due to increase in counterfeit card frauds and due to SEPA (Single Europe Payment Association) mandate, most of the countries migrated to EMV Chip Card and PIN. Malaysia: Malaysia migrated to EMV chip card with signature in 2005 to address counterfeit frauds and to comply with regulator mandate. Post migration, domestic counterfeit fraud in Malaysia had reduced drastically. However, international counterfeit fraud is still a concern due to usage of these cards as magnetic stripe cards in non-EMV markets. Malaysia has a regulator mandate for EMV Chip Card and PIN from January 2015 as lost or stolen card frauds have increased significantly. UK: EMV Chip Card issuance commenced from 2005. Issuance of EMV Chip Card and PIN commenced from February 2006 as per regulator mandate. UK, similar to Malaysia, had seen significant reduction in domestic counterfeit fraud. Singapore: Singapore had migrated to EMV chip cards from beginning of 2011 due to regulator mandate. Industry Initiative Australia & New Zealand: Australia and New Zealand have started issuing EMV chip cards for new and renewal cards as part of industry initiative. Both the countries propose to completely migrate to EMV chip from 2013 & 2014 respectively. Brazil & Mexico: Few banks are implementing EMV Chip card issuance pilot projects to counter high counterfeit card fraud. However, the readiness of ATMs to accept EMV Chip Card varies across the globe. Refer APPENDIX B for more details on global EMV Chip Card Issuance & Acceptance. Some key considerations: Migration timelines vary from 4-6 years depending on size of industry Fraud moves to the weakest link – RBI’s move in securing Card Not Present Transactions first has ensured industry is well placed. Fraud typically migrates from current fraud havens as- and- when these countries put in place controls to neighbouring countries. Malaysia and Singapore have implemented anti-skimming and second factor controls recently. PIN as a second factor authentication Certain issuers such as Citibank and SBI issue maestro debit cards. Maestro debit cards are magnetic stripe cards that require a PIN to be entered at POS terminal. Besides maestro, Citibank also issues debit cards that do not require PIN for POS transactions. Citibank‟s experience has been that card usage levels are significantly lower when PIN is required to be entered at POS terminal. EMV Chip Issuing Infrastructure Readiness Over 99% of the total cards issued in India are magnetic stripe cards. Currently, few large issuing banks like Citibank, ICICI Bank, HDFC Bank and SBI are issuing EMV chip cards. These banks are issuing chip cards typically to customers who frequently travel internationally and to customers who have high credit limits. All these cards are used as Chip and Signature. None of the issuing banks have started issuing Chip and Pin Cards. EMV Chip Acquiring Infrastructure Readiness Approximately 90% of the existing POS machines are enabled to accept EMV chip cards. The POS terminals are managed by 21 acquirers (APPENDIX H), with 3 acquirers (Axis / HDFC / ICICI) dominating with over 85% market share. ATMs are currently not enabled for acceptance of EMV chip cards. However, approximately 50% of the existing ATMs are capable with upgrades to hardware and software. The rest 50% of the ATMs need major hardware upgrade (or even replacements) to enable chip card acceptance. Large scale infrastructure creation - UIDAI The Unique identification project (UID) is an ambitious project which aims to provide a unique biometric ID for all Indian residents. How this becomes relevant to the working group‟s consideration is when we consider using the biometric ID as a second factor for authentication of all Card Present transactions. This will require an upgrade of the acquiring infrastructure with Finger print readers. Some key considerations: While debit cards account for nearly 90% of the total plastics issued in the country, debit spends are less than 30% of overall spends though growing very fast. Bulk of the international spends are on Credit Cards The UIDAI’s Aadhaar and its possible ubiquity is a consideration which requires further review pending adoption and usage of UID Strengthening the Existing Payments Infrastructure The current payments infrastructure in India requires certain enhancements to make the payment infrastructure secure. These enhancements include: 1. Securing the Technology Infrastructure
2. Improving Fraud Risk Management Practices 3. Strengthening Merchant Sourcing and Monitoring Process 1. Securing the technology Infrastructure Currently all transaction data travels from POS terminal/ATM to the host system in clear text format except for the PIN data. The transaction data travels through various communication carriers like PSTN, IP WAN, GPRS, and CDMA. Any data compromise due to wire-tapping at merchant establishments or during the communication carriage can lead to fraud losses and reputation risk for the issuing and acquiring banks. The working group deliberated at length on the various solutions that can secure the payment infrastructure. The following 3 solutions are proposed for securing the technology infrastructure: 1a. Unique Key per Terminal (UKPT) Unique Key per Terminal (UKPT) is a key management scheme, where each POS terminal/ ATM has a unique key for encrypting data originating from a terminal/ATM. UKTP is the common method of encryption implemented worldwide on ATM/POS. Currently, acquirers in India use a single key to encrypt transaction data originating from all their POS terminals. There is a risk in having the same key across all POS terminals. Incase of key compromise of a particular terminal, then all the terminals of the acquirer are compromised. Looking at the current practice in the Indian market for POS, the data exposure risk which exists currently, UKPT needs to be adopted. Derived Unique Key per Transaction (DUKPT) DUKPT is one level higher form of POS transaction data encryption than UKPT. DUKPT uses one time keys that are generated for every transaction and then the key is discarded. The advantage is that if one of these keys is compromised, only one transaction will be compromised. 1b. Terminal Line Encryption (TLE) It is critical to build adequate controls to safeguard customer and transaction information during the transaction life cycle. Currently information flow between the acquiring host, issuer host and switch are encrypted; the residual risk being the fact that the transaction data packets flow in clear between the terminal and the acquiring host. This exposes the payment infrastructure to possible data compromise through wire tapping. TLE also protects against other threats like eavesdropping/card skimming, host spoofing, replay attacks in addition to wire tapping. TLE offers an encrypted terminal line from the POS terminal to the bank acquirer host when transferring transaction data packets during online transaction processing. It uses a „Line Encryption Server‟ which facilitates the encryption and decryption of the transaction data packets. Many countries across the globe have implemented TLE to secure the payment infrastructure; examples are Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Europe, and USA. 2. Improving Fraud Risk Management Practices Adoption of appropriate Risk Mitigation Techniques & Strategies Risk mitigation processes and policies are an integral part of any business strategy; hence it is imperative that adequate risk mitigation strategies and controls are adopted by organizations. It is important for organizations to have a well defined process of risk management viz. Identification, Detection, Investigation, Deterrence and Prevention. Risk management would encompass all risk types viz Fraud, Credit, Operational, Reputational. Please refer Appendix D for detailed tabling of Minimum Control Measures (Standards) to be adopted by issuers/acquirers. Also enclosed are certain additional Best Practices which banks could consider. This addresses the below risks: a. Issuance Risk b. Merchant Acquiring Risk c. ATM Risk 3. Strengthening Merchant Sourcing and Monitoring Process As we strengthen various elements of the payment eco-system, the merchant sourcing process – merchant validation, and monitoring - becomes a weak link/point of failure for the overall system. Hence, there is a need to tighten the current merchant sourcing documentation through the following: 3a. Merchant Sourcing Documentation The following is the minimum document requirements for sourcing merchants to be followed by acquiring banks. Any exception to the above shall be made by the authorized bank /acquirer. Merchant Eligibility 1. Merchant Application Form duly signed and stamped by the authorised signatory 2. Merchant Establishment Agreement duly signed and stamped by the authorised signatory. 3. Business License / Registration copy (any of the following)
CST / ST number may be waived for applications from the following establishments: i) Central or State Government undertakings viz (Railways, airways, govt emporiums, govt hospitals, customs). ii) Schools and Colleges: For these a letter from the authorized signatory on the letterhead will be acceptable. iii) Private Hospitals, clinics, diagnostic centers: In these cases a letter from the authorized signatory on the letterhead or relevant registration document copy iv) Chemists: For these cases copy of drug license will be acceptable. In the above document, the Merchant Name and Address to be the same as per the Account Opening Documents (AOD). v) In case of petroleum merchants, a copy of the agreement with the petroleum company or a delivery challan would suffice) vi) IATA certification for Travel agents Note: If the business license has expired and the expiry is less than 3 month from date of sourcing of the ME application, visitation from the local credit officer / Relationship Manager along-with a copy of the expired business license would suffice; else the acknowledgement copy for renewal of license is mandatory. 4. Vintage --Can differ from bank to bank basis individual bank policy. 5. Turnover Criteria -- Can differ from bank to bank basis individual bank policy. 6. Contact Point Verification will be mandatory 7. Merchant negative database check using CIBIL bureau - only post CIBIL infra goes live with merchant repository 8. Signature verification of the authorized signatory (Any of driving license, passport copy, banker‟s verification, PAN card, Credit Card, others as per the Bank's policy) 9. In addition to above, further documentation as per merchants registered entity type will be required: 8.1 Partnership - Partnership Authority Letter - Partnership Deed 9.2 Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) -Declaration by all member of the HUF 8.3 Private/Public Limited Company - Board Resolution - Certificate of Incorporation - Memorandum of Association - Articles of Association Strengthening the plastic and introducing Second Factor Authentication Based on detailed evaluation of various options on parameters like customer impact, issuer impact, acquirer impact, merchant impact, global interoperability and residual risks, the following three solutions sets emerge: 1. Magnetic Stripe Card and PIN 2. Magnetic Stripe Card and Biometric (Aadhaar finger print) 3. EMV Chip Card and PIN 1. Magnetic Stripe Card and PIN Over 99% of the credit and debit cards issued in the country are Magnetic Stripe Cards. Currently, PIN is required only for ATM transactions and not for POS transactions. PIN protects against lost and stolen card fraud. PIN is prompted on the POS terminal based on the following:
If Magnetic Stripe Card and PIN is to be mandated for all POS transactions, then:
Magnetic Stripe Card and PIN fulfills the short term objective (next 2/3 years) of protecting against lost and stolen card frauds. Securing the payment infrastructure is critical prior to the roll out of this option. The effort involved in changing the eco-system is estimated to be 12- 18 months for a complete roll out. MSD+PIN could be a short term solution till such time the industry migrates to a well established long term solution. 2. EMV Chip Card and PIN EMV Chip Card protects against counterfeit (skimming) card fraud. EMV Chip Card and PIN protects against both counterfeit (skimming) and lost & stolen card fraud. Currently, only few large issuing banks like Citibank, ICICI Bank, HDFC Bank and SBI are issuing EMV chip cards. Most of other banks‟ host systems are not ready and are not certified for issuance of chip card. Changes are required on the authorization switch, issuing host, and card embossing platforms. Banks who are currently issuing EMV Chip cards are issuing as Chip and Signature. None of the issuing banks have started issuing Chip and Pin Cards. Hence, all banks need to make necessary technology changes and get themselves certified to issue Chip and PIN cards. Based on international experience, EMV Chip Card and PIN migration typically takes 5 years. However, the migration timelines depend on the market size. Refer Appendix G for more details on EMV Chip and PIN 3. Magnetic Stripe and Biometric (Aadhaar finger print) Authentication Magnetic Stripe Card and Biometric (Aadhaar finger print) protect against both domestic counterfeit (skimming) and lost & stolen card fraud. Biometric (finger print) captured by UIDAI can be used as authentication for protection against both domestic counterfeit and lost & stolen card fraud as the cardholder has to be physically be present at the POS terminal/ATM to authenticate the transaction. Even if the card is counterfeited, the fraudster will not be able to use the card as biometric of the customer would be required. Aadhaar authentication using biometrics provides a strong “Who you are” factor of authentication. This can be combined with a second “What you have” or “What you know” factor to achieve strong customer identification at the point of sale. This option is technically quite strong. However, acceptance of biometric for payment authentication is not been proven. Refer Appendix F for more details on Aadhaar and UIDAI A brief comparison of the above 3 solution options is enclosed in APPENDIX E. At few merchant categories like fuel stations and restaurants, there are execution challenges in adopting PIN or biometric as additional factor of authentication. Of all the available options that provides worldwide acceptance but the major disadvantage is in terms of cost of the card and need of reissuance due to short validity of the cards which comes to every 5 years (which is currently 7 to 10 years for debit cards) The following is basis for the recommendations proposed by the Working Group: 1. FRAUD LEVELS 1.1 Fraud to Sales ratios and absolute fraud levels are low as of date, however future proofing payment eco-system is a key consideration. 1.2 Fraud levels on international transactions are significantly higher when compared to domestic transactions. 2. GLOBAL LEARNINGS 2.1 EMV Chip Card is the internationally accepted solution for strengthening authentication of card present transactions. It is also the most widely deployed solution. This is the recommended standard for protecting against skimming by all Payments Associations worldwide. 3. COST 3.1 The cost of EMV Chip Card & PIN solution is quite high relative to the cost of other options and relative to the revenue of the industry. 4. INFRASTRUCTURE READINESS 4.1 Over 90% of domestic acquiring POS infrastructure is EMV Chip Card enabled. However, ATM infrastructure is not enabled for EMV Chip Card. 4.2 Number of debit cards are quite large relative to number of credit cards. Also, there is difference in activation levels at POS. Hence, the need for differentiated approach for debit and credit cards. 5. INDIAN CONTEXT 5.1 India is the only country to have a concept of a biometric (Aadhaar finger print). While it is very early to assess UID for off-take and transaction authentication, UID could be a national asset which, if executed well, will benefit all stakeholders. 5.2 For Domestic transactions, EMV + PIN and Magnetic Stripe + Biometric will achieve similar security goals for protecting against counterfeit and loss and stolen card frauds since UID as additional factor authentication requires the person to be present at the POS terminal at the time of transaction for biometric capture. The working group arrived at the final recommendations based on the following critical factors: 1. Putting in place a series of measures to strengthen the Payments infrastructure and ecosystem in the country 2. The need for a hybrid approach - the evolving nature of UIDAI, varying international and domestic trends. 3. The need for a PIN (to ensure Lost and Stolen fraud is minimized) over and above protecting for skimming (Counterfeit). The choice of PIN though would be at the discretion of the Issuer. 4. Important to ensure that both offline and online PINs are accepted by the EDC machines so that interoperability is ensured. 5. Open, reloadable prepaid cards to be treated as “debit “ equivalent as far as group recommendations as concerned. 6. Differentiated implementation timelines for debit and credit cards. 7. EMV Cards for international travelers to be prioritized 8. Minimize throw-away costs and technology efforts for all stakeholders. 9. Evaluation of UIDAI‟s Aadhaar roll out as a strong alternative for domestic transactions 18 months from now based on:
Recommendations The following are the recommendations of the Working Group: 1. Strengthening the existing Payment Infrastructure & Future Proofing the system The first step prior to implementing additional controls and authentication would be strengthening the existing payment infrastructure by securing the technology infrastructure, improving fraud risk management practices across all stakeholders, and strengthening merchant sourcing process. Towards this, the following would be important technical and process changes for the industry to make over the next 24 months:
2. Introducing an Additional factor of authentication: Debit Cards. Also includes fully prepaid (Open) Cards
4. Introducing an Additional factor of authentication: Credit Cards
IMPORTANT: Based on fraud trends, the migration timeline / approach might vary Some emerging Technologies to consider in the long run One of the options available for payment ecosystem players to consider is Contactless smart cards . This of course will come about once the acquiring and the issuing ecosystem evolves and stakeholders start seeing the merit and the commercial viability in investing in a technology like this. Transit payments (metro rail, buses, toll), Loyalty applications and Micro-transactions might accelerate the move to contactless cards in India. Contactless transactions are known to be significantly faster and more efficient than magnetic stripe / contact cards. Multiple applications -- ID, access control, debit, credit, transit, toll, e-purse, egovernance could all be based on such contactless cards. There could be varied uses for this e.g. allowing microtransactions (up to say Rs 1000) to be executed without a PIN According to Juniper Research, by 2013, one in five smart phones in the world would have Near Field Communication (NFC) capability. NFC is also available as a Micro SD card /sticker. Once the acquiring infrastructure and ecosystem is built for contactless, the same could be seamlessly migrated to NFC. In India, we could have contactless cards for a large section of the population which cannot afford an NFC phone. The others might migrate to the cardless convenience of the NFC phone.
Appendix B - EMV Worldwide Deployment & Adoption*
Appendix C - Stress Test Inferences and Global EMV Migration Experiences 1 Stress Test Inferences The working committee studied the fraud trends across other geographies and conducted stress test by extrapolating the fraud exposure and ratios basis the trends noticed in other countries. The inferences drawn basis the stress tests conducted are listed below for reference:
Inferences drawn from these case studies clearly indicate the need to have a much stronger authentication mechanism and reiterate the need for a Second factor for Card Present Transactions. More importantly the case studies also indicate the need to start working towards implementation of Second factor immediately, to be ready to combat frauds in case adverse conditions arise. Even if EMV Chip is adopted by issuers, the need to have adequate control over fall back transactions and second factor in form of PIN is reiterated basis global experience and the stress test and case studies. 2 European payment card industry experience on Chip and PIN migration There is a clear consensus that the migration to Chip and PIN is bringing significant benefits to the European payment card industry. Indeed, the implementation of Chip and PIN is seen as significant for several reasons: • Security In those countries with a mature Chip and PIN acceptance environment, the technology has contributed to a marked decrease in fraud from counterfeit and lost and stolen cards – which traditionally accounted for the majority of losses. As addressed throughout the document, however, there has been a definite migration to cardnot- present (CNP) fraud losses and an increase in cross-border counterfeit fraud, particularly at ATMs. Chip and PIN has contributed to a marked decrease in fraud from counterfeit and lost and stolen cards • Capability As well as delivering increased security, Chip technology is enabling banks and merchants alike to extend the reach of cashless payments. For example, contactless payments are seen as a natural “add on” to EMV. Similarly, Chip and PIN is enabling a big increase in unattended or self-service payments. EMV Chip technology enables banks and merchants to extend the reach of cashless payments. It has facilitated a big increase in unattended or self-service payments • A smooth and effective migration process In each of the three countries investigated in this document, the migration from signature to PIN has been smooth and effective. Consumers and merchants alike have been quick to adapt to the new Cardholder Verification Method (CVM). Acceptance issues (whereby, for example, a retailer refuses to accept a magnetic stripe card or a signature-preferring Chip card) have been minimal, and there has been no negative impact on the volume of card payments. On the contrary, it has been suggested that the change may have contributed to a progressive increase in POS spending volume. Acceptance issues have been minimal • Positive reactions to the change Reactions from all stakeholders have generally been very positive. When the European payment card industry planned the migration to EMV, it initially considered a Chip and signature solution. However, it was soon acknowledged that this would have limited benefits to merchants, and the retail community was extremely resistant. By contrast, the retail community became a strong advocate of Chip and PIN. In the UK in particular, large retail groups have cited:
Also, many merchants have been quick to deploy additional card payment facilities (which are either enabled by, or made far more secure by Chip and PIN). This includes self-checkout facilities, and other types of self-service payment (such as unattended transport ticketing, vending and pay-at-pump fuel payments). All evidence suggests that consumers have reacted equally positively. They have adapted quickly to the change and see that it delivers increased security. Similarly, a traditionally hostile media has generally reacted positively to the change, portraying it as a logical and positive step forward by the payment card industry. Merchants have been quick to deploy additional card payment facilities Cardholders have adapted quickly to Chip and PIN at POS and see that it delivers increased security • Important lessons learnt Although the change has been smooth and effective, the European payment card industry acknowledges that important lessons have been learnt: 1. The migration of fraud To derive maximum benefit from Chip and PIN, issuers and acquirers alike need to be aware of the way fraud migrates, and be prepared to implement new risk management disciplines. Particular consideration needs to be given to those acceptance environments that are yet to be Chip and PIN-enabled. 2. PIN integrity considerations As the use of PIN becomes more commonplace, issuers and acquirers alike need to be aware of the risks of PIN compromise and take measures to ensure that any such risks are minimised (through, for example, a programme of cardholder and merchant education/communication). 3. ATM security considerations Banks need to treat their domestic ATM estates as an absolute priority (quickly upgrading them to EMV and ensuring that effective anti-skimming measures are implemented). Also issuers need to put new risk management measures in place to identify and avoid the risks of fraudulent ATM withdrawals (such as new authorisation parameters and also anti-counterfeit tools such as iCVV). We have reviewed the Post migration experiences of select European Countries that have implemented EMV Chip + PIN and the results are as below
In terms of acquired fraud, a broadly similar pattern can be seen in all three countries. Thanks to chip and PIN, acquirers have been able to stabilise and, in many cases, reduce fraud losses in those instances where the card is present. For CNP transactions, however, acquirers have seen a marked increase in losses.
In terms of issued fraud, a similar picture emerges across all three countries. Domestic cardpresent fraud losses have seen a significant reduction. However, savings have been offset by increases in cross-border counterfeit and CNP fraud. Appendix D – Merchant Sourcing and Monitoring Minimum Control Measures (Standards) and Additional best practices Issuer Risk Mitigation Every financial institution or organization which is in the business of issuance of cards (Credit Cards, Debit Cards, Prepaid Cards) need to ensure adherence to the following Minimum Control Standards. Wherever the activities are outsourced, the respective issuers would still be responsible for ensuring adherence to the standards.
Merchant Acquiring Risk Mitigation Minimum Control Standards – Acquiring Risk All Acquirers in the business of merchant acquiring need to ensure adherence to the Minimum Control Standards. Wherever the activities are outsourced, the respective acquiring banks would still be responsible for ensuring adherence to the standards.
ATM Risk Mitigation Minimum Control Standards – ATM Risk Given the recent fraud trends it is imperative that adequate controls are placed to safeguard the ATM infrastructure and enhance security of ATM transactions. a. The below mentioned processes should be implemented by the issuers with regard to usage of cards for ATM transactions and by the acquirers / outsourced service providers who are involved in the ATM installation and acquiring.
Additional Best Practices which could be considered by banks – ATM Risks
Appendix E – Solution Set Comparison
Appendix F - UIDAI (Unique Identification Authority of India) The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), is an agency of the Government of India responsible for implementing the envisioned Multipurpose National Identity Card or Unique Identification card (UID Card) project in India. It was established in February 2009, and will own and operate the Unique Identification Number database. The authority will aim at providing a unique number to all Indians, but not smart cards. The authority would provide a database of residents containing very simple data in biometrics. The brand name of the Unique Identification number (UID) is called as Aadhaar. The UIDAI's mandate is to issue every resident a unique identification number linked to the resident's demographic and biometric information, which they can use to identify themselves anywhere in India, and to access a host of benefits and services. The number (referred to until now as the 'UID') has been named Aadhaar, which translates into 'foundation', or 'support'. This word is present across most Indian languages and can therefore be used in branding and communication of the UIDAI program across the country. UIDAI has already issued around 73 lakh Aadhaar numbers and will soon launch its authentication services. The authentication infrastructure is being sized to handle a large volume of authentications that will be generated by Government and other sectors. Aadhaar authentication using biometrics provides a strong “Who you are” factor of authentication. This can be combined with a second “What you have” or “What you know” factor to achieve strong customer identification at the point of sale. ATM and POS infrastructure can be upgraded to include an additional biometric scanner. UIDAI has also published MicroATM standards, encryption Standards, and biometric standards, which allows for secure interoperable payment transactions based on biometric authentication. In many cases, as has been demonstrated by the financial inclusion projects of various banks, biometric provide an inclusive factor of authentication for a population that finds it hard to use a PIN. All payment networks: Visa, MasterCard, and NPCI are actively working with UIDAI on laboratory and field pilots. The biometric payload adds up about 500 bytes of additional data to the transaction, which is easily handled by the payments switching architecture. As the systems are tested in a production environment and mature, various Banks have plans to roll out Aadhaar linked payment products. Even at the early stages of UIDAI the working group debated and agreed upon that this is a strong potential future option for country like the size of India can adopt for its payment transaction authentications. The working committee has considered Biometric (UID) as the second factor in one of the solution sets; however the decision to adopt this would depend on various factors like number of UIDs issued to the population which transacts on cards, error rates, authentication network capability to handle transaction volumes, network capability to handle enhanced transaction size and acquiring infrastructure. Appendix G - EMV (Euro pay, Master Visa Standards) The EMV Integrated Circuit Card Specifications for Payment Systems are global payment industry specifications that describe the requirements for interoperability between chip based consumer payment applications and acceptance terminals to enable payment. The specifications are managed by the organization EMV Co. The EMV standards were started by a working group created in 1993 by the world‟s three mainstream payment organizations: EUROPAY (EPI), MasterCard (MCI) and Visa. The name EMV is derived from the first letter of each of these three organizations. Now EMVCo is owned by American Express, JCB, MasterCard and Visa, who manages, maintains and enhances the Integrated Circuit Card (ICC) Specifications to ensure global interoperability of chip-based payment cards with acceptance devices including point of sale terminals and ATMs. The group‟s objective is to define a common set of standards (EMV standards) for smart card based payment applications. These standards allow the card and the acceptance device to work seamlessly and securely together. The EMV specifications were written with the following objectives:
The EMV specifications provide a set of rules that allow a chip card and the acceptance device to communicate with one another. The EMV specifications are based upon the common set of standards developed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) for integrated circuit (chip) cards and related acceptance devices. The current version of the EMV ‟96 specifications (version 3.1.1), published in May 1998, defines requirements for the interaction of debit and credit card functions on a chip card and a terminal. The components in these specifications cover requirements for cards, applications, and terminals. A new release EMV2000 (EMV 4.2) is currently available. EMV is designed to significantly improve the security for consumer card payments by providing enabling features for reducing fraudulent payment that results from counterfeit and lost and stolen cards. The features that are defined by EMV are as follows -:
In order to accelerate the deployment of EMV technology, existing card schemes have implemented fraud liability shift. These rule changes “shift” liability for fraud that could have been prevented if EMV chip and/or PIN technology had been used, by both parties, to the issuing or acquiring party that had not invested in EMV chip and / or PIN equipment. EMV supports two different types of data authentication: Offline Data Authentication: The Offline Data Authentication ensures that the ICC card is not counterfeited and that the data is not deteriorated or falsified. It is a process whereby the card is validated at the point of transaction using RSA public key technology to protect against counterfeit or skimming. The flow of the EMV transaction ensures to authenticate the card and the terminal in the process by means of verifications of the cryptograms. The keys used as part of certificates in the cards as well as the public keys on the terminals is in general 10 years and there are multiple keys active and loaded in terminals at any given point to support all the existing EMV cards in the market. Online Data Authentication: The Online Data Authentication further ensures the card issuer that the card used in the transaction is actually the card issued by the issuer. EMV includes three forms of Offline Data Authentication:
Note: RSA (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman - the inventors of the RSA cryptosystem) public key technology. Static Data Authentication (SDA): SDA is a type of Offline Data Authentication whereby the terminal validates a cryptographic value placed on the card during personalization of the card. This validation protects against some types of counterfeit, but does not protect against copying and replaying attack. Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA): DDA is a type of Offline Data Authentication where the card generates a digital signature using transaction-specific dynamic data elements, for validation by the terminal to protect against skimming. Combined DDA/Application Cryptogram Generation (CDA): CDA is a type of Offline Dynamic Data Authentication, combined with processing of the transaction application cryptogram. Appendix H – Acquirer wise terminals data
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