The relevance of systemic risk in the financial sector has been underscored by the global financial
crisis. It is the risk of disruption to financial services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or
parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the
real economy. The importance of the measurement of systemic risk in the financial sector is growing
significantly.The importance of the measurement of systemic risk in the financial sector is growing
significantly. In fact, measuring aggregate financial sector risk, i.e. the occurrence of a systemic
event which would have severe implications not only on the stability of the financial system but also
on the economy at large, has become one of the key area of research worldwide. Systemic risk
measurement is clearly in its early stages of evolution. There are various approaches for the
measurement of systemic risk and financial statement-based measures, exposure-based network models
and measures based on capital market data are the prominent ones. However, these measures are not
fully consistent and over-reliance on one measure may lead to biased inference. This requires a
comprehensive approach to arrive at a conclusive decision by considering measures achieved through
different methodologies.
Monitoring of financial stability indicators and conducting stress-testing exercises are the main
practical approaches of macroprudential oversight. Stress testing is forward looking and can be tailored
to the specifics of a given financial system. Stress tests are meant to evaluate the resilience of individual
financial institutions and of financial sectors to highly adverse but plausible events. They are used to
quantify vulnerabilities, both from a microprudential perspective within Supervisory Risk Assessments,
where financial institutions are analysed individually, and from a macroprudential perspective within
Financial Stability Analyses, where the resilience of the entire financial sector to adverse macroeconomic
shocks is tested.
5.1 In this report, the stability of banks has been
studied through the Joint Probability of Distress
(JPoD) and the Banking Stability Index (BSI), which
takes into account the impact of one bank on others
through direct or indirect links. Further, the resilience
of the commercial banks in respect of credit, interest
rate and liquidity risks were also studied through stress
testing by imparting extreme but plausible shocks. A
stress test on the projected balance sheet was
undertaken for the commercial banking system which
included both baseline and stressed scenarios. The
credit risk of the commercial banks has also been tested
through macro-stress test models, which link measures
of credit risk to the macroeconomic variables using
multivariate regression equation as well as a Vector
Autoregressive (VAR) approach. Single factor sensitivity analysis of credit risk of scheduled urban co-operative
banks and non-banking financial companies were also
conducted. The methodologies used in these stress
tests are described in the Annex.
Banking Stability Measures1
5.2 During times of distress, the fortunes of banks
typically decline concurrently through direct links or
through indirect links which include mark-to-market
asset values, interbank lending and information
asymmetries. This section models distress dependencies
as the financial system is conceptualised as a portfolio
of a specific group of banks (Segoviano and Goodhart,
2009)2. In particular, the Banking System’s Portfolio
Multivariate Density (BSMD), which characterises both
the individual and joint asset value movements of the portfolio of banks, is recovered from the empirically
observed Probabilities of Distress (PoDs) of the banks
under analysis (Box 5.1 CIMDO-Approach)3. The BSMD
embeds banks’ distress dependence structure, which
captures banks’ linear (correlations) and non-linear
distress dependence, and their changes throughout the
economic cycle, reflecting the fact that dependence
increases in periods of distress. By recovering the (entire)
portfolio multivariate density that describes the system;
the CIMDO-approach allows to analyse financial stability
from three different, yet, complementary perspectives;
viz., (i) common distress of the financial institutions in a system, (ii) distress between specific institutions, and
(iii) distress in the system associated by distress in a
specific institution. The possibility to analyse financial
stability from complementary perspectives represents
a key advantage over the analysis of any single
perspective by providing policy makers with an enhanced
set of information that might be useful to identify how
risks are evolving, and where contagion might most
easily develop. This methodology also offers great
flexibility for implementation, since the PoDs of
individual bank represent the input variables, which can
be estimated using alternative approaches4.
Box 5.1. CIMDO-Approach
In modeling distress dependence, methodology
described by Goodhart and Segoviano (2009) has been
followed. First, the financial system has been
conceptualised as a portfolio of institutions (FIs). Then,
the PoD of the individual institutions, comprising the
portfolio, has been inferred from equity prices
(Figure 5.1). Subsequently, using as inputs (exogenous
variables) such PoDs, and employing the Consistent
Information Multivariate Density Optimizing (CIMDO)
methodology (Segoviano, 2006), a novel non-parametric
approach based on cross-entropy, the financial system’s portfolio multivariate density (FSMD) have been
derived. Lastly, from the FSMD a set of conditional
PoDs of specific pairs of FIs, and the financial system’s
JPoD are estimated.
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The FSMD and thus, the estimated conditional
probabilities and the JPoD, embed the institutions’
distress dependence. This captures the linear
(correlation) and non-linear dependencies among the
FIs in the portfolio, and allows for these to change
throughout the economic cycle. These are key
advantages over traditional risk models that most of
the time incorporate only correlations, and assume that
they are constant throughout the economic cycle.
The distress dependence structure embedded
in the FSMD is characterised by the CIMDO-copula
(Segoviano, 2006). The structure of linear and nonlinear
dependencies among the assets in a portfolio
can be represented by copula functions. This approach
infers copulas directly from the joint movement of
individual PoDs. This is in comparison to parametric
copula approaches, in which parametric copula
functions have to be chosen and calibrated explicitly—
usually a difficult task, especially under data constraints.
Common distress in the system: JPoD and BSI
Distress dependence down from crisis period, but
cropping up again
5.3 For the first perspective, two indicators, the Joint
Probability of Distress (JPoD) and the Banking Stability
Index (BSI) have been used5. The JPoD represents the
probability of all the banks in the system (portfolio)
becoming distressed. Whereas, BSI reflects the expected
number of banks becoming distressed given that at least
one bank has become distressed. The JPoD and BSI were
estimated for the period from October 2007 up to
February 2011 and are presented in Chart 5.1. It may be
observed that the expected number of banks (out of the
sample of 20) which was under distress was 4 during
the crisis has declined to 1 by the last quarter of 2010.
But, it has again increased to 2 during the first quarter
of 2011. Distress dependence across banks rises during
times of crisis, indicating that systemic risks, as implied
by the JPoD and the BSI, rise faster than individual risks.
The JPoD and the BSI not only take account of individual
banks’ probabilities of distress, but these measures also
embed banks’ distress dependence. Therefore, these
measures may experience larger and nonlinear increases
than those experienced by the probabilities of distress
(PoDs) of individual banks. Chart 5.2 shows that daily
percentage changes of the JPoD are larger than
daily percentage changes of the average of individual
PoDs. This empirical fact provides evidence that
in times of distress, not only do individual PoDs
increase, but so does distress dependence. Therefore,
measures of financial stability that are based on averages
or indices may not be able to indicate the proper
estimates.
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Distress between specific institutions
5.4 To analyse stability from the second perspective,
a set of pair wise conditional probabilities of distress,
have been estimated which are described as a Distress
Dependence (DiDe) Matrix. The matrix shows the
conditional probability of distress of the bank on a row
given that the bank on the column falls in distress. The
distress dependences are estimated daily. The distress
dependency of a bank is analysed through a Toxicity
Index which shows that if that bank is in distress what
is the expected probability of it causing distress to
another bank in the system.
5.5 The distress dependence across major banks
increased substantially (Chart 5.3). For the purpose of
comparative analysis, October 10, 2007 and September
20, 2008 have been chosen to evaluate how conditional
probabilities of distress evolved from an initial stage
of the crisis to the aftermath of Lehman Brothers filing
for bankruptcy. On average, if any of the banks fell into
distress, the average probability of the other banks
being distressed increased from 17 percent on October
10, 2007 to 42 percent on September 20, 2008.
Moreover, on an average, distress of a specific bank
would have caused the highest distress in the
system (toxicity) in October 2007 (29 percent) while
in September 2008, it would have been another bank
that would have caused the highest toxicity (53
percent).
 |
5.6 From the DiDe matrix, Vulnerability Index (VI),
which quantifies the vulnerability of a bank given
distress in the other banks in the system6, is derived
and presented in Chart 5.4. It may be observed from the
chart that the vulnerability of banks was high during
the recent financial crisis but declined substantially
during the subsequent period. Whereas, during the
recent period, a marginal increase in vulnerability has
been observed.
Even though distress dependence does not imply
causality, these results show that the analysis of distress
dependence, even several weeks prior to a distress event,
can provide useful insights into how distress in a specific
institution can affect other institutions and ultimately
the stability of the system.
Cascade Effects
5.7 To analyse stability from the third perspective,
the Probability of Cascade Effects (PCE) has been used.
This represents the likelihood that one or more banks
in the system become distressed, given a specific bank
becomes distressed. Thus, this indicator is useful to
quantify the systemic importance of a specific bank,
if it becomes distressed, signaling the possible
“domino” effects of that specific institution.
Chart 5.5 shows bank-wise indicator across time for
select banks. It is clear from the chart that cascade effect
of select banks declined substantially after the crisis
period.
Credit Risk
Under stress conditions, profits lowered but not much
pressure on capital adequacy
5.8 A scenario analysis was undertaken for testing the
credit risk using a balance sheet approach. The balance
sheet and profit and loss account of the banks were
projected for March 2012. Along with an enhancement
in the provisioning requirements as proposed in the
Monetary Policy Statement for the year 2011-12, the
scenario framework also assumed that 30 per cent of
restructured standard assets would turn into NPAs.
Plausible shocks were administered on the projected
financials of the banks to gauge their impact and the
resilience of the system. The analysis was carried out
both at the aggregate level as well as at the individual
bank level based on supervisory data for March 2011.
5.9 Under the stress condition, profitability of banks
were adversely affected (Chart 5.6). The Return on Assets
(RoA) density function under stress conditions shifted
towards negative values indicating more and more banks
unable to earn positive returns under the assumed stress
conditions. However, the banking system was able to
withstand an adverse NPA shock reasonably with their
capital fund (Table 5.1). At end-March 2012, the projected
system level CRAR remained at 11.27 per cent, while at
individual bank level, except for one small bank, all
banks maintained the CRAR above 9 per cent. The
percentage of gross NPAs to total advances increased to
2.92 per cent as at end-March 2012 from 2.34 per cent
as at end-March 2011 mainly on account of assumption
of 30 per cent of restructured standard assets turning
into NPAs. Under the most stringent credit quality shock
of 150 per cent on the baseline, when the NPA level
increased to 6.33 per cent, the system CRAR stood at
9.33 per cent. However, the system level CRAR was
adversely affected under very extreme deterioration of
asset quality, when the NPA rose by 168 per cent,
impacting 25 banks having a share of 46.00 per cent in
total assets, whose CRAR fell below 9 per cent.
 |
Table 5.1 : Stress Test on Projected Balance Sheet |
|
Gross NPAs per cent to Total Advances(%) |
CRAR (%) |
Number of banks whose CRAR falls below 9% |
Share in total assets of banks whose CRAR falls below 9% (%) |
(1) |
(2) |
(3) |
(4) |
(5) |
March 2011 |
2.34 |
13.09 |
0 |
0 |
Projected Baseline: March 2012 |
Baseline |
2.92 |
11.27 |
1 |
0.15 |
Assumed Stress Conditions: March 2012 Increase in NPA |
50 % |
4.06 |
10.79 |
8 |
23.27 |
100 % |
5.19 |
10.15 |
15 |
34.58 |
150 % |
6.33 |
9.33 |
22 |
43.41 |
Reverse Stress Testing: March 2012 Threshold Level (System level CRAR) |
168 % |
6.74 |
9.00 |
25 |
46.00 |
Source: Supervisory data and RBI staff calculations |
Interest Rate Risk - Duration of Equity
DoE at elevated level… Not much negative impact on
capital, though
5.10 Duration of Equity (DoE) of commercial banks,
which shows extent of erosion in capital due to unit
increase in interest rates, continued to remain at an
elevated level, albeit a short detour, in recent quarters.
This suggests active involvement of banks in managing
interest rate risks (Chart 5.7). Further, the distribution of DoE under the two scenarios showing movement of
banks from higher duration to lower duration time
buckets (Charts 5.8 and 5.9) indicates that the banks’
vulnerability to increase in interest rate will not be very
significant under normal conditions. On the balance,
need for maintaining a lower level of DoE on sustained
basis, may be a possible recourse available to the banks.
Liquidity Risk
Lurking liquidity constraints under stringent stress
scenarios while no potential strains at hand
5.11 Liquidity stress tests showed that a few banks
did not have adequate liquid assets to meet the
withdrawals on the first day itself. The number of such
banks increased in March 2011 as compared to March
2010. However, the total number of banks unable to
withstand the stress scenario at the end of five days
was higher in March 2010 (Charts 5.10 and 5.11)
indicating a slight improvement of the position under
the liquidity stress tests relative to the previous
assessment.
 |
 |
5.12 The analysis of liquidity of banks for the quarter
March 2011 is also done using Liquidity Sustainability
Ratio (LSR) which has been defined as (Liquid Assets/
Outflows in 1-14 days time bucket). Under the stress
scenario the outflow is assumed to be increased by a
factor of 3. In the baseline scenario only 5 banks had
LSR less than 1, which increased to 29 banks under the
stress scenario. These banks have to meet the outflow
through purchased liquidity, which is expensive. Further, under stress situation, with falling confidence, these
banks may face extreme liquidity constraints showing
signs of vulnerability for the system (Chart 5.12).
Macro-stress tests: Multivariate Regression7
Impact of macroeconomic shocks on banking sector
not substantial
5.13 The model based approach for the macro-stress
test used a multivariate equation which directly links
macroeconomic variables to measures of bank
performance. The impact of macro variables on nonperforming
advances (NPAs), defined as ratio of gross
non-performing advances to total advances, was
estimated. The NPA-ratio was observed to be strongly
auto-correlated. Though related negatively to agricultural
and industrial GDP growth rates, it was seen to have
positive relationship with short term nominal interest
rate and inversely related to export-to-GDP ratio.
5.14 The model was used to forecast NPAs under the
baseline as well as stress scenarios, with a stress test
risk horizon of one year. The baseline and stress
scenarios were constructed based on assumptions
detailed in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
Table 5.2: Baseline Projections |
Forecast
Period |
Real GDP
Growth |
Nominal
Interest rate
(Short Term) |
Exports to
GDP Ratio |
2011-12 |
Q1 |
8.00 |
7.00 |
14.40 |
|
Q2 |
7.80 |
7.00 |
14.30 |
|
Q3 |
7.30 |
7.00 |
15.40 |
|
Q4 |
7.00 |
7.00 |
15.60 |
Table 5.3: Stress Scenarios |
Time horizon |
Shock level(basis points) |
Real GDP
Growth Shock |
Nominal
Interest
Rate (Short Term) Shock |
Exports to
GDP Ratio
Shock |
2011-12 |
- 150 |
+ 150 |
- 300 |
5.15 The results (Charts 5.13 and 5.14) show that
impact of select macroeconomic variables, in the
aforesaid macro-stress testing model, are not very
significant. The results, under different scenarios,
therefore, suggest that the macroeconomic shocks would
not substantially threaten the Indian banking sector.
Macro-stress tests: VAR Model
With interest rates rising, loan losses may follow suit
5.16 A vast body of literature endorses the fact that
changes in macroeconomic conditions of any economy
do impact banks’ performance, simultaneously or with
a lag. It is also possible that the feedback effects of bank
instability on real economic activity could amplify the
fluctuations especially during recessions. Therefore, in
order to judge the resilience of banking sector to various
macroeconomic shocks, Vector Autoregressive (VAR)
approach has been adopted. The advantage of VAR model
is that, it allows to fully capture the interaction among
macroeconomic variables and banks’ stability variable.
It also captures the entailed feedback effect.
5.17 This exercise has been done using quarterly data
since Q1 of 2001-02 to Q4 of 2010-11 on four
macroeconomic variables, namely, GDP growth, inflation
based on WPI, call money rate and Real Effective
Exchange Rate (REER). Further, to reflect banks’ stability,
slippage ratio has been considered.
5.18 Based on the estimated VAR(2), the impulse
response was generated. The accumulated response of
slippage ratio to innovation in growth rate, inflation,
call rate and REER is presented in the Chart 5.15. It is
observed that one standard deviation (positive) shock
to GDP growth will lead to decline in slippage ratio by
0.10 over a period of nine quarters. Though inflation
has positive impact on slippage ratio, this impact was
observed to be marginal: one standard deviation
(positive) shock in inflation would raise the slippage ratio
by 0.02 over two quarters. However, interest rate has
not only significant impact on slippage ratio, such impact
was also seen to be long lasting. One standard deviation
(positive) shock in call rate tended to raise slippage ratio
by 0.22 over twelve quarter. Whereas, REER had negative
impact on slippage ratio, one standard deviation
(positive) shock in REER prompted a fall in slippage ratio
by 0.07 over six quarters.
 |
 |
Under stress scenarios of lower GDP growth and higher
rates of inflation & interest, NPA ratio would increase
further
5.19 Based on the impulse response function of the
VAR, Gross NPA ratio was estimated under two stress
scenarios and is presented in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Non Performing Advances Ratio Under Stress Conditions |
Quarter |
Baseline |
Scenario I |
Scenario II |
Jun-11 |
2.53 |
2.53 |
2.53 |
Sep-11 |
2.69 |
2.71 |
2.74 |
Dec-11 |
2.79 |
2.87 |
2.95 |
Mar-12 |
2.95 |
3.13 |
3.31 |
Scenario I: GDP growth will decline by 150 basis points
(negative shock), WPI based inflation will increase by
150 basis points, interest rate will increase by 100 basis
points and rupee will depreciate by 10 per cent (negative
shock).
Scenario II: GDP growth will decline by 250 basis points
(negative shock), WPI based inflation will increase by
250 basis points, interest rate will increase by 200 basis
points and rupee will depreciate by 20 per cent (negative
shock).
The results indicated that under the baseline scenario,
the Gross NPA ratio is expected to be around 2.95 per
cent by March 2012 a rise of 64 basis points over the
March 2011 figures, while under the extreme stress
conditions, this ratio is projected to rise further to
around 3.31 per cent.
5.20 It is observed from impulse response and variance
decomposition that among all the four selected
macroeconomic variables, viz., GDP growth, inflation,
interest rate and exchange rate; interest rate has the
highest (negative) impact on slippage ratio of the banks.
This may have profound implications at this point of
time considering the fact that stubborn inflation rate
would prompt interest rates to keep on hardening
impacting adversely asset quality of banks.
Urban Co-operative Banks
Credit risk not alarming
5.21 Stress tests on credit risk were conducted on
Scheduled Urban Co-operative Banks (SUCBs) using their
asset portfolio as at end-March 2011. The results are
based on single factor sensitivity analysis. Impact of
shocks on CRAR was tested under three different
scenarios, which assumes (i) increase in NPA ratio by 50
per cent, (ii) increase in NPA ratio by 100 per cent and
(iii) no profit earned by banks (Chart 5.16). It is observed
that SUCBs could withstand shocks assumed under
scenarios I and III easily. However, the sector would come
under some stress under the stringent scenario II.
Non-Banking Financial Companies (ND-SI)
Impact of credit risk on capital not very significant
5.22 A stress test on credit risk for NBFC-ND-SI sector
was carried out as on March 2010 under two scenarios
(i) Gross NPA increased two times and (ii) Gross NPA
increased 5 times from current level. It was observed that first scenario did not warrant any additional
provision as the sector had excess provision towards
NPAs while in the second scenario, it was observed that
even though there was shortfall in provisioning the
impact on CRAR was negligible as the sector had a higher
level of CRAR of 37.1 per cent as against the required
level of 12 per cent.
Concluding Remarks
5.23 Distress dependence across banks rises during
times of crisis, indicating that systemic risks, as implied
by the JPoD and the BSI, rise faster than individual risks.
The distress dependence across major banks increased
substantially during the global crisis period. The
vulnerability of banks was high during the recent
financial crisis but declined substantially during the
subsequent period. However, during the recent period,
a marginal increase in vulnerability has been observed
for Indian banks. The cascade indicator quantifies the
systemic importance of a specific bank, if it becomes
distressed, signaling the possible “domino” effects of
that specific institution. The cascade effect of select
banks declined substantially after the crisis period.
5.24 Projected balance sheet analysis indicated that
under stressful conditions, profitability of commercial
banks may get adversely affected. However, the banking
system would be able to withstand an adverse NPA shock
reasonably easily because of its high capital levels. The
interest rate risk through the Duration of Equity (DoE)
method showed that the DoE continued to remain at
elevated level, with an improvement in recent quarters,
suggesting active involvement of banks in managing
interest rate risks. Regarding liquidity stress test, under
severe stress situation, when market sentiment is poor,
some banks may face extreme liquidity constrain and
may show a sign of vulnerability. The results of macrostress
test under different scenarios suggested that
macroeconomic shocks would not substantially threaten
the Indian banking sector. The VAR methodology
indicated that in the current environment of stubborn
inflation, which may prompt the interest to be hardened,
the asset quality of banks may be impacted adversely.
The credit risk stress tests on NBFC-ND-SI and scheduled
UCBs revealed that the impact on CRAR under different
scenarios would not be alarming.
1 This model for Indian banking system has been developed by Mr. Miguel A. Segoviano, CNBV (Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores :
Mexican financial Regulatory-Supervisory Agency).
2 In this study twenty scheduled commercial banks have been considered comprising about seventy five per cent of total assets of commercial banks.
3 The BSMD is recovered using the Consistent Information Multivariate Density Optimizing (CIMDO) methodology Segoviano Miguel ( 2006)
which is a non-parametric framework based on the cross-entropy approach (Kullback, 1959). Segoviano Miguel (2006): Consistent Information
Multivariate Density Optimizing Methodology, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics, Discussion Paper 557.
4 There are also other methodologies to estimate probabilities of distress (PoDs), notably using CAMEL ratings, Merton approach, etc.
The PoDs for banks were estimated from their equity return distributions. Under this approach, first, banks’ historical distributions of
equity returns are estimated. Then, the probability of returns falling under the historical worse .05 per cent of the cases (99.5 VaR) is
quantified. Therefore, the PoD of a specific bank represents the probability that the bank’s equity return would fall in the worse.05 historical
percentile.
5 See Segoviano and Goodhart (2009): Banking Stability Measures. IMF.WP/09/4 for definitions.
6 For example for a system with three FIs, the VI for the financial institution A would be estimated as P(A/B)*P(B) + P(A/C)*P(C)
7 i) Cihak, M. (2007). Introduction to Applied Stress Testing. IMF Working Paper WP/07/59.
ii) Juraj Zemen, Pavol Jurca (2008): Macro Stress Testing of Slovak Banking Sector. Working Paper 1/2008. National Bank of Slovakia.
iii) Marco, Sorge (2004). Stress-testing financial systems: an overview of current methodologies. BIS Working Papers No 165.
iv) Philippines: Financial System Stability Assessment Update (2010). IMF Country Report No. 10/90. April 2010. |