Financial Sector Reform: Review and Prospects - RBI - Reserve Bank of India
Financial Sector Reform: Review and Prospects*
Dr. Y. V. Reddy, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India
Delivered on Nov 20, 1998
I am thankful to Professor Nirvikar Singh for giving me this opportunity to be with a group of very eminent economists, with deep understanding of various aspects of Indias economy. I have set, for myself, a humble task of presenting before you, a consolidated account of financial reform measures undertaken so far, and indicate where we were before reform and where we are now. Comments and outlook in regard to some of the measures would also be in order, keeping in view internationally acceptable standards or practices. The main focus would naturally be on the RBIs role in banking sector and financial markets. I will conclude by highlighting what emerge as the most critical issues that need to be currently addressed.
Main Features
The financial system in India built a vast net work of financial institutions and markets over time, and the sector is dominated by banking sector which accounts for about two-thirds of the assets of the organised financial sector. The first phase of current reform of financial sector was initiated in 1992, based on the recommendations of Committee on Financial System (CFS or Narasimham Committee). Briefly stated, the main features of the financial sector reforms undertaken so far are: First, financial sector reforms (FSR) were undertaken as part of overall economic reform. Second, while the reform process itself commenced in India well after many developing countries undertook reform, FSR were undertaken early in the reform cycle. Third, these were orderly as designed by a high-level committee taking into account the prevailing circumstances. Fourth, while on the regulatory aspects and relevant financial ratios, there was discernible progress, on structural aspects, especially public ownership and incentive structures including autonomy of public sector banks, reform process fell short of expectations of CFS. Fifth, the reforms have brought about some efficiency, as for example evidenced by recent reduction in interest spreads or increasing trend in household savings, especially financial savings. Sixth, the financial system and in particular the banking system displays continued stability relative to other countries. While during the initial stages of the FSR, India was often criticised as being far too gradual, the financial crisis in the past two years which have afflicted a number of developing countries, not to talk about some developed countries, have shown the merits of Indias gradual reforms.
Finally, the progress that has been made in a substantial yet non-disruptive manner, has given confidence to launch what has been described as second generation or second phase of reforms - especially in the banking sector.
In this background, a second Committee under Mr. Narasimham, who chaired the CFS, was constituted to advice Government on banking sector reforms (CBSR) . The Report of the Committee (April 1998) provides a framework for the current phase of reforms. The RBI has already acted on many of the recommendations as per announcements made in Governor Jalans October 1998 Monetary and Credit Policy Review statement.
RBIS Approach
RBIs approach to reform in financial sector has been ably articulated by Dr. C. Rangarajan in his speeches as Governor, RBI. The approach that governs both the first and second phase is similar and, could be summarised as pancha-sutra or five principles.
First, cautious and proper sequencing of various measures giving adequate time to the various agents to undertake the necessary norms; e.g., the gradual introduction of prudential norms.
Second, mutually reinforcing measures, that as a package would be enabling reform but non-disruptive of the confidence in the system, e.g., combining reduction in refinance with reduction in the cash reserve ratio (CRR) which obviously improved bank profitability.
Third, complementarity between reforms in banking sector and changes in fiscal, external and monetary policies, especially in terms of co-ordination with Government; e.g., recapitalisation of Government owned banks coupled with prudential regulation; abolition of ad hoc treasury bills and its replacement with a system of ways and means advances, coupled with reforms in debt markets.
Fourth, developing financial infrastructure in terms of supervisory body, audit standards, technology and legal framework; e.g., establishment of Board for Financial Supervision, setting up of the Institute for Development and Research in Banking Technology, legal amendment to the RBI Act on Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs).
Fifth, taking initiatives to nurture, develop and integrate money, debt and forex markets, in a way that all major banks have an opportunity to develop skills, participate and benefit; e.g., gradual reduction in the minimum period for maturity of term deposits and permitting banks to determine the penalty structure in respect of premature withdrawal, syndication in respect of loans, flexibility to invest in money and debt market instruments, greater freedom to banks to borrow from and invest abroad.
Reform Measures and Outlook
Reform measures have been grouped, for convenience, and presented in Annexure I. The pre-reform position, reform measures undertaken on an year wise basis, current status and comments on outlook are indicated. I will mention here only some significant aspects to link up with critical issues that we intend identifying.
Preemptions
Major problem faced by the banking system was on account of constraints, mainly in terms of massive preemption of banks resources to finance Governments budgetary needs and administered interest rates. Removal of these constraints meant a planned reduction in statutory preemption and a gradual deregulation of interest rate prescriptions. Since FSR, total effective preemption has been brought down from 54 per cent to less than 35 per cent. The effective CRR which was as high as 16.5 per cent has been brought down to 9.75 per cent. CRR in excess of 3 per cent is currently remunerated at 4 per cent per annum. Given that the CRR is a tax on the banking system it is better to gradually reduce the CRR rather than maintain a much higher CRR with a relatively higher remuneration on these balances. The medium-term objective of reducing CRR has to take account of money supply considerations and also the objectives of exchange rate stabilisation. Furthermore, reduction of the CRR would depend on manoeuarability on money supply impact presently constrained by degree of monetisation of fiscal deficit and uncertainties in forex markets.
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) has been gradually brought down from an average effective rate of 37.4 in 1992 to the statutory minimum of 25 per cent though at present, many banks hold SLR well in excess of statutory prescription. Further reduction in SLR, though desirable, would have to await reductions in fiscal deficit apart from needed improvements in prudential standards including internal risk management systems. Ofcourse, enabling legislative changes would also be needed.
Interest Rates
Structure of administered interest rates has been almost totally dismantled. Prescriptions of rates on all term deposits, including conditions of premature withdrawal, and offering uniform rate irrespective of size of deposits have been dispensed with. Currently, there is a prescribed rate of 4.5 per cent for savings bank accounts which are used by individuals virtually as current accounts and as the cost of servicing these accounts is high the remuneration on these accounts has necessarily got to be low. There is yet to emerge a consensus on further deregulation of interest rate on savings deposits. There is understandably a differentiated interest rate ceiling prescribed for foreign currency denominated deposits from non-resident Indians, and such ceiling will have to continue as part of managing external debt flows, especially short-term flows till fuller liberalisation of capital account. Lending rates for different categories, which were earlier prescribed, have been gradually abolished but transparency is insisted upon. Each Bank is required to announce Prime Lending Rates (PLR) and the maximum spread that it charges. However, there are three exceptions. Currently interest rate on smaller advances (i.e., up to Rs.200,000) should not exceed PLR. The element of concessionality of very small loans below Rs.200,000 has to be seen in the context of very small loans. As the figure up to Rs.200,000 has not been adjusted since 1990, the real effective protection for small loans has been gradually reduced by the inflation drift. Lending rate for exports are still prescribed. The prescription of interest rates for exports linked to the period of availment is to some extent used as an instrument to influence leads and lags in repatriation of export proceeds. Finally, ceilings are prescribed in respect of certain advances in foreign currency, which could be reviewed.
Prudential Norms
Prudential norms are being introduced gradually to meet the international standards. Consequent upon CBSR recommendations, action has already been initiated to increase the capital adequacy ratio; assign risk weights to Government approved securities, to take care of the market risks; and also assign risk weights to open position in forex and gold. In most of these, a time table has been indicated for the first phase only, so that banks are on notice for the first phase while the RBI has retained the freedom to decide on the timing of the second phase. Given the normal growth of 17 to 18 per cent in credit, and the required level of capital adequacy after implementing CBSR recommendations, a substantial infusion of capital into the banking system will be warranted. This is likely to have significant implications for public sector. Government has to weigh the desirability of further budgetary support vis-à-vis substantial reduction in share of Government ownership of banks. Incidentally, as long as capital markets are sluggish, and their view on banks, bearish, a high proportion of divestment may be needed to raise the resources needed, since share premia may be low.
Similarly, internationally accepted norms of income recognition have been introduced except that income on asset is not recognised if it is not received within two quarters after it is past due, i.e., due date plus thirty days. The international norm is 90 days. Tighter standards, though desirable, have to be introduced gradually so that both banks and borrowers have notice to adjust their operations, and there is no serious disruption in the normal banking activity or erosion in public confidence in the banking system due to balance sheet impact. Also, a sharp tightening of the norms would pose an unbearable burden on banks and would serve no substantive purpose unless corresponding changes are made in credit appraisal systems and debt recovery mechanisms.
Asset classification, which was introduced as per internationally acceptable practices early in the reform process is sought to be further strengthened gradually, as per CBSR. A significant decision taken relates to treatment of assets guaranteed by the State Government as non-performing under certain circumstances. This is a somewhat exceptional provision to take care of the temporary delays observed in respect of a few State Governments in honouring their guarantee obligations when invoked.
Competition and Transparency
Competition is sought to be fostered by permitting new private sector banks, and more liberal entry of branches of foreign banks. The share of public sector banks in the banking business is going down, particularly in metropolitan areas. Competition is sought to be fostered in rural and semi-urban areas also by encouraging Local Area Banks. Some diversification of ownership in select public sector banks has helped the process of autonomy and thus some response to competitive pressures. The RBIs efforts to enhance competition do, however, take into account the response of public sector banks and their principal, the Government. There are some banking institutions such as cooperatives, regional rural banks and local area banks, which are yet to be brought fully into the discipline of reform process.
The transparency and disclosure standards have been enhanced to meet international standards, though there are a few areas where we are lagging. These relate to maturity pattern of assets and liabilities, movements in provision account and NPAs and progress needs to be made in all these areas. To provide an authentic comparative information on the performance of banks, the RBIs annual publication `Trend and Progress of Banking in India presents, since the last two years, detailed information on individual banks enabling public assessment of the working of banks.
Supervision
An independent Board for Financial Supervision under aegis of the RBI has been established, and consistent with international practice, focus is also on offsite inspections and on control systems internal to the banks. Status of implementation of Core Principles of Banking Supervision (Annex II) shows that of 46 principles, 33 have been implemented, 11 are partially implemented, while only two are yet to be implemented. These two relate to the critical aspect of adequacy of reserves against country risk and transfer risk; and consolidated reporting. While the former is not a major issue at this juncture in view of limited cross border exposure, the latter is of significance warranting early action. Even in respect of the Core Principles, which have been implemented, the RBI is making constant efforts to improve the quality of supervision and the skills of supervisors.
Credit Controls
Selective credit controls have been dispensed with. Micro-regulation of credit-delivery has been given up, and there is a greater freedom to both banks and borrowers in matters relating to credit. However, there are apprehensions on two counts, viz., the discipline of priority sector lending and flow of credit to the needy and deserving, on a timely basis. The advances eligible for priority sector lending have been enlarged, interest rates deregulated and alternate avenues of investment permitted, thus making the priority lending far more flexible than before. No doubt, banks are averse to sub-ceilings in priority sector, and have some problems with procedural requirements. The major area of serious concern relates to Government sponsored programmes involving subsidies, where there are serious problems of both co-ordination and recovery. CBSR has made some recommendations and these are still under consideration.
There was a general consensus that the real issue in credit-delivery is more availability of credit than cost. Consequent upon the deregulation of interest rates, there was an expectation that credit flow to the needy will be enhanced, but there is some disappointment about the credit-delivery especially to small industry. Procedural simplifications have been advised by the RBI for rural credit, credit to small industry and more recently the RBI is working on procedural streamlining for export credit.
Incentives and Legal Reforms
The most critical issue in financial sector reform relates to consequences of the extent of public ownership and special laws governing publicly owned banks. CBSR has devoted a significant part of its report to reform of public sector banks, on which Government, as the principal, needs to act. At present, public ownership has adverse effects on level playing field among banks, capacity and willingness to compete in the market place, incentives to perform, and binding work practices/methods that inhibit efficiency. The issue of efficiency in public sector banks has several dimensions, and legal is one of them. Again, issues of optimal efficiency, autonomy and ownership are intertwined and need to be resolved. Reduction of public ownership below the majority level prescribed would need an amendment to the three different laws that govern public sector banks. Sale of shares already held by Government also needs amendments to law.
Debt Recovery
Progress in establishing and operationalising debt-recovery systems has been painfully slow, partly due to judicial review. CBSR suggested several legislative measures that would facilitate debt-recovery, securitisation, electronic systems etc. A serious consequence of tightening prudential norms and pressurising banks to reduce NPA without strengthening the debt-recovery system is the choking of credit. While large corporates may be partly spared by recourse to alternate sources such as debentures or commercial paper, the rest, especially medium and smaller corporates could face credit choke and hence the pace of introduction of measures needs to be carefully modulated.
Accounting Standards
There is apprehension in some quarters that the Indian Accounting standards followed by the Indian banks are not in line with International Accounting Standards. Annexure III gives a comparative position of some of the significant standards relevant to banking sector and comparative Indian standards/regulations. It will be seen that on accounting and valuation, Indian standards and defacto practices are comparable with international standards. The major area of divergence in accounting is in respect of group accounting and consolidation. In India, currently consolidation is not required and investments in associated companies are not accounted for under equity method. In regard to disclosure, Indian banks do not, at present, disclose maturity pattern of assets/liabilities, concentrations of assets liabilities and off balance sheet items, net foreign currency exposure, movement in provisions account, and gross non-performing assets and related party transactions in the financial statements. However, as regards disclosure of related party transactions, banks are prohibited from granting advances to firms in which a Director is interested. RBI has formally stated that instructions on further disclosures will be announced in due course. Meanwhile, many banks are also taking steps to build appropriate information systems, which some disclosures entail.
Financial Markets
Since April 1997, the RBI has been taking special efforts to develop the various segments of the financial markets, in particular, money market, Government securities market and foreign exchange market (Annexure IV to VI). Significant steps have been taken to introduce new instruments, strengthen the institutional infrastructure, widen the participant base, introduce efficient settlement mechanism, rationalise tax measures, and improve transparency in operations.
Money Market
In order to facilitate the conduct of monetary policy, it is essential to improve the efficiency of transmission mechanism through the money market. Among the measures taken by the RBI in the recent past are: cautious entry to additional participants in the inter-bank call money market; actions to develop the term money market, the major among them being the exemption of inter-bank liabilities from CRR and SLR stipulations; and refinements in instruments such as Commercial Paper, Certificate of Deposit, inter-bank participation certificate and rediscounting of commercial bills. The RBI has also been conducting repos of 3/4/14 days both on auction and fixed interest rate basis, depending on prevailing situation in the market. The medium-term objective is to make the call/term money market purely inter-bank market for banks while non-bank participants who are not subject to reserve requirements can have free access to other money market instruments and operate through repos in a variety of instruments. The completion of documentation and operational details will pave the way for the introduction of interest rate swaps and other derivative instruments. With proper asset-liability management systems in place, the term money market can also be expected to develop. An electronic dealing system is envisaged to be operationalised by March 1999. The RBI recognises that a Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) needs to be introduced, but this will depend on the replacement of General Refinance Scheme though not necessarily on a review of export refinance.
Government Securities Market
With the switchover to borrowings by Government at market related interest rates, and more recently, abolition of system of automatic monetisation, it was possible to progress towards a genuine market for Government securities. Reforms instituted by the RBI in this market include selling of Government securities through auctions; introduction of new instruments such as zero coupon bonds, floating rate bonds and capital indexed bonds; introduction of Treasury Bills of varying maturities; establishment of specialised institution, viz., Securities Trading Corporation; institution of system of Primary Dealers and Satellite Dealers; institution of the system of Delivery versus payment; prescription of standard valuation norms; and transparency in operations through market process and dissemination of information.
Future developments in the Government Securities market hinges on three main issues, viz., legal reforms, technological upgradation and achievement of standardised practices. The legislative measures relate to Public Debt Act, to be consistent with modern technology and market practices; Amendment to Securities Contract Regulations Act to allow derivatives and give formal jurisdiction to RBI to regulate the Government debt market; and abolition of Stamp duty to avoid transaction costs in debt markets. These are essential for enabling the development of the market. Development of technology is an integral part of reforming the debt market and the RBI has embarked upon the technological upgradation of debt market. Introduction of the Electronic Dealing System, a Real Time Gross settlement System, integrating the payments and settlement systems for Government securities are all part of the short-term agenda. Finally, standardisation of practices with regard to manner of quotes, conclusion of deals and code of best practices are being evolved for repo transactions.
Foreign Exchange Market
Measures initiated to integrate the Indian forex market with global financial system include permitting banks to fix their own position limits as per international terms and aggregate Gap Limits; to borrow from and invest abroad up to 15 per cent of their Tier I capital; and to arrange to hedge risks for corporate clients through derivative instruments. Other measures such as permitting forward cover for some participants, and the development of the rupee-forex swap markets also have provided additional instruments to hedge risks and help reduce exchange rate volatility. There has been a temporary slow down in further progress due to uncertainties in the market. These matters will have to be reviewed from time to time and the process of reform restored with appropriate change.
The road map for longer-term developments in the forex markets has been drawn by the Committee on Capital Account Convertibility but a view will have to be taken on each one of them depending on domestic and international developments, especially the pace of liberalisation of the capital account. In any case, the process of liberalisation of capital account itself will, to a large extent depend, inter alia, on progress of financial sector reforms.
Critical Issues
In identifying critical issues, it is necessary to recognise the strengths of the Indian banking sector. These include, long history of regulation, early start of financial reforms, stability imparted by reserve requirements, limited exposure to risky assets such as real estate or stocks or foreign currency, strict control over off-balance sheet transactions, and relatively well diversified credit exposures, rather than undue concentrations. However, greater efficiency can be brought about, only and only if co-ordinated efforts are made by RBI, Government of India and banks themselves.
Reserve Bank of India
First, the medium-term objective of reducing preemptions will be pursued, subject to reduction in fiscal deficit by Government, monetary developments vis-à-vis growth in real output, and uncertainties in forex markets. Reduction in CRR will help improve profitability of banks. No doubt, reduction in refinance window will give greater flexibility in this regard.
Second, on interest rate regime, reform objectives continue to be further deregulation and enabling environment for reduction in interest spreads. These would again depend on the progress in reduction of fiscal deficit; reduction in non-performing assets which in turn needs changes in debt recovery system as also improvement in credit appraisal systems by banks themselves; and rationalisation of interest rates in small savings, bonds, etc., which are alternatives for savers. Furthermore, inflationary expectations do play a critical role in determining interest rates, and these in turn, are dependent on credibility of price stability.
Third, RBI will pursue with implementation of the first phase of reform announced in October, 1998 and mount the second phase of reform on prudential requirements soon. These requirements would, however, warrant significant additions to the capital of the banking system as a whole. Further progress will depend on resolution of issues in Government relating to budgetary support, permitting access to capital markets, the strategy for weak banks, mergers, possible changes in the percentage of public ownership, etc.
Fourth, RBI will continue to foster competition between banks and in due course between banks and other financial intermediaries. The issue of competition with other financial intermediaries has to recognise the level playing field argument warranting special treatment to banks as long as they have large preemptions, especially CRR - again linked to fiscal deficit. As regards competition among banks, the issues relating to diversified ownership, incentive structure and reorganisation of public sector banks have to be addressed by Government to enable RBI to pursue measures to enhance competition without serious systemic implications. RBI will intensify consultations with Centre and States, on issues relating to co-operatives and Regional Rural Banks.
Fifth, RBI would also pursue vigorously, improvements in transparency, disclosure standards as also accounting standards to attain the best international practices. Similarly, compliance with Core Principles is being expedited. To focus on criticality of payment and settlement systems, the October 1998 statement on Monetary Policy has laid out a concrete programme of implementing the banking sector reforms.
Sixth, credit-delivery systems will be improved to ensure smooth credit flow but this is facilitated only when legal systems and judicial processes are reviewed to replace cumbersome, and time consuming procedures. In addition to laws relating to debt recovery, changes in bankruptcy law, tenancy laws, urban land ceilings etc. would be needed to ensure that the collateral offered is in reality a realisable collateral.
Seventh, improvements in financial markets are being so attempted by the RBI as to address both technological and procedural/documentation issues. Development of money and debt markets would also require, among other things, reduction in preemptions, amendments to Securities Contract Act, replacement of Public Debt Act and resolution of Stamp Duty issue.
Government of India
It is very clear that further progress in financial sector would, to a significant extent, depend on the resolution of fiscal, legal, and structural issues.
First, sustainable level of fiscal deficit is of paramount importance. Furthermore, cost of raising resources, viz., interest payment for small savings and tax treatment on income from Government securities need to be reviewed. A view has to be taken on budgetary support for recapitalisation of banks and contingent liabilities in case Asset Reconstruction Company route is favoured. An appropriate approach is also needed on how the Government sponsored subsidised special programmes of employment generation would operate in the new milieu.
Second, legislative changes that are essential for successful reform are many and CBSR had attempted to address these issues. In particular, legislative changes affecting debt recovery and growth of financial markets, as already listed, are very critical. Legislative changes may also be needed for greater flexibility in change of public ownership.
Third, structural issues affecting public sector banks have been dwelt at length by CBSR, and suffice to say that the reordering of relationship between Government as principal/owner and banks as agents, through legislative changes or otherwise, would influence the further direction of reform, introduction of competitive pressures and incentive-structures for efficiency-enhancement. Key to financial sector reform is banking reform; key to banking reform is public sector banking reform; and key to public sector banking sector reform is Governments initiative.
Banks
It is clear that actions of RBI and initiatives of Government provide enabling environment, incentive framework and to some extent punitive measures. The outcome will depend on the response of banks, i.e., boards of banks, management, officers and staff. There are, in particular, four broad areas of internal systems which may need thorough overhauling and which need to be facilitated by Government and the RBI.
First, the internal control systems in the banks, especially Public Sector Banks.
Second, the placement, work practices etc., which inhibit incentives for efficiency and improved customer service.
Third, flexibility in obtaining and enhancing highly skilled or talented people.
Fourth, introduction and effective use of technology in banks, especially public sector banks.
Conclusion
I trust I have brought to your notice the efforts made by the RBI, the challenges before us, and the need for co-ordinated actions between the RBI, Government of India and banks themselves. You would appreciate that, by and large, we try to be aware of what is desirable and we are implementing whatever is feasible.
Thank you.
Annexure I
Banking Sector Reform
Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
1. Removal of external constraints (a) Reduction of pre-emptions (i) Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) |
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Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
(ii) Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) |
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Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
(b) Interest rate deregulation (i) Deposit Rates |
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Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
(ii) Lending rates |
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Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
2. Prudential (a) Capital |
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Foreign banks by 31 March 1993 Indian banks with international operations by 31 March 1994 Other banks 4% by March 1993 8% by March 1996 |
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Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
(b) Income |
Banks could not recognise income on these categories.
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Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
(c) Asset Classification |
Assets were classified into eight health code categories as under : 1. Satisfactory 2. Irregular 3. Sick viable under 4. Sick Non-viable/sticky 5. Advances recalled 6. Suit filed accounts 7.Decreed debts 8. Debts classified by the banks as bad/doubtful The classification was left to the discretion of each bank and was not objective. |
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Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
(d) Provisioning standards |
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Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
(e) Classification and Valuation of Investment Portfolio. |
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Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
3. Competition |
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The Narasimham Committee has suggested that :
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Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
4. Transparency and Disclosure |
The income in the profit and loss account was shown net of all provisions and therefore provisions were not disclosed. Loss on sale or revaluation of investments and other assets could be deducted from income. Only aggregate amounts under a few categories were disclosed in the Profit and Loss Account. There were no schedules or detailed break-up. The Balance Sheet disclosure was also very limited. Accounting policies were not disclosed. |
Details of provision made category-wise i.e. towards NPAs, depreciation etc. Amount of subordinated debt raised as Tier II capital Gross value of investments less cumulative depreciation.
Capital adequacy ratio Tier I capital Capital adequacy ratio Tier II capital Interest income as a percentage of average working funds Operating profit as a percentage of average working funds Return on assets Business (deposits and advances) per employee Profit per employee |
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Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
5. Supervisory System |
Dependence on on-site inspection of banks. Focus on deposit mobilisation priority sector credit and credit portfolio. Investment and risk management not given much importance. Long inspection cycles Emphasis was on solvency and not on other aspects like capital adequacy, liquidity management etc. |
The supervisory strategy as finalised by BFS in 1994 has four components.
The system of concurrent audit has been introduced. Each bank has to designate 'Compliance Officer' to act as nodal officer. |
The RBI supervisory strategy consists of both onsite inspections and off-site surveillance. A detailed off-site surveillance system based on prudential supervisory framework on a quarterly basis covering all important areas has been made operational. In regard to on-site inspections the process is now on the evaluation of the total operations and performance of the bank under the CAMEL system. Apart from evaluating asset quality and compliance with prudential norms focus is now on the effective functioning of Board management, efficacy of internal audit and control systems and risk management. The entire cycle of inspection and follow up action is now completed within a maximum period of twelve months. |
The Narasimham Committee has recommended that an integrated system of regulation and supervision be put in place to regulate and supervise the activities of banks, financial institutions and non-bank finance companies (NBFCs) the agency to be called Board for Financial Regulation and Supervision (BFRS). The BFRS should be given statutory powers and be reconstituted in such a way as to be composed of professionals. At present, the professional inputs are largely available in an advisory board which acts as a distinct entity supporting the BFS. The Committee, taking note of the formation of BFS has recommended that the process of separating it from the Reserve Bank qua central Bank should begin and the Board should be invested with requisite autonomy and armed with necessary powers so as to allow it to develop experience and professional expertise and to function effectively. However, with a view to retain an organic linkage with RBI, the Governor, RBI should be head of the BFRS. Supervisory skills of RBI may need enhancement, especially to capture technological changes and new financial instruments.
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Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
6. Risk |
Focus was entirely on credit risk and to a large extent on the management of foreign exchange risk and operating risk.
Emphasis on toning up of the appraisal standard, strengthening post sanction supervision and intensive follow-up of large value accounts. Introduction of health code norms for classification of advances, single and group exposure limits set up by RBI; and banks required to set up industry exposure norms. b) Foreign Exchange Risk Internal control guidelines issued in a comprehensive manner in 1981. Main emphasis on setting up open position limits and aggregate gap limits. c) Operating Risk Focus on fraud reporting and preventive measures; emphasis on house keeping i.e. balancing of books and reconciliation of interbank and inter branch accounts. |
a) Credit Risk : Introduction of income recognition and asset classification norms; Introduction of capital for credit risk as per Basle Committee's recommendation Drawing up loan policy and recovery policy by banks Extending the exposure norms to cover all forms of exposure in addition to credit exposure b) Forex Risk A Committee looked into the entire gamut of foreign exchange markets in India Consequent to the recommendation of this Committee, the method of computation of open position was refined and setting up of open position limits was made banks specific and liberalised Introduction of market risk capital for open position limits in foreign exchange and gold. More flexible setting up of aggregate gap limits; Introduction of simple value at risk calculation in respect of forward gaps d) Operating Risk: Intensive monitoring of inter branch, inter bank and nostro accounts, reconciliation by RBI Introduction of concurrent audit by banks Setting up of Audit Committee of Board Setting up of compliance officers Implementation of recommendations of Jilani Committee for strengthening of internal inspection and audit system in banks e) Treasury Operations Introduction of standards for conduct of investment operations including audit and accounting norms. |
Having introduced credit risk, management attention is now focussed on market risk management particularly in the context of deregulation and liberalisation of interest rates. Comprehensive asset liability management systems are being introduced from 1 April 1999 to take care of interest rate, liquidity and currency risks. |
Asset Liability Management guidelines are to be finalised. A view has to be taken on the introduction of capital for market risk. |
Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
7. Credit Controls/ Credit Delivery System |
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1993 Banks were given freedom to decide on their own the levels of holdings of inventory and receivables of various industries while assessing credit requirements of borrowers. 1993 The threshold limit of obligatory consortium lending raised from Rs.50 million to Rs.500 million. 1995-1996 Loan system for Delivery of Bank Credit for working capital purpose was introduced to bring about greater discipline in credit utilisation and to gain better control over borrowers in respect of borrowers with assessed maximum permissible bank finance of Rs.200 million and above. The cash credit component was initially restricted to 70% and then gradually reduced to 60%, 40 per cent and 25 per cent in 1996. The system was also extended to borrowers with assessed MPBF of Rs.100 million to Rs.200 million and cash credit component fixed at 40 per cent. 1996 The levy of commitment charge was left to the discretion of banks. Mandatory levy of additional interest on certain portion of book debt finance was also withdrawn. 1996 Participating banks in a consortium were permitted to frame ground rules of the consortium arrangements. |
There is no mandatory consortium requirement and borrowers can either have single or multiple banking arrangements or syndicate/consortium method. The regulations on credit will form part of the loan policy which has to be formulated by each bank with Board'' approval. There is considerable flexibility with regard to credit delivery systems for borrowers. Procedural simplifications in regard to agriculture and small industry has been brought about recently and such simplification for export sector is expected soon. |
With pressure on banks to reduce NPA's and in the absence of effective debt recovery systems the credit flow especially to medium and small sector is reported to be choked. |
Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
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1997 In order to provide greater freedom in assessing working capital requirements all instructions relating to Maximum Permissible Bank Finance (MPBF) were withdrawn and banks were advised to evolve their own methods for assessment. Banks were required to lay down loan policy for each industry for this purpose. 1997 Mandatory requirement on formation of consortium for borrowal accounts with limit of Rs.500 million and above from more than one bank withdrawn. 1997 Limits on grant of term loans for projects by banks was withdrawn. Banks are free to sanction term loans for projects within the ceiling of exposure norms. 1997 Loan component for all borrowers with credit limit of Rs.100 million and above made uniform at 80 per cent. 1997 Credit Monitoring Arrangement which replaced Credit Authorisation Scheme was withdrawn. 1996 - Selective credit controls on all sensitive commodities was abolished except for sugar. |
Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
8. Priority Sector Lending or Directed Credit |
10 per cent by March 1989 12 per cent by March 1990 15 per cent by March 1992 |
1992 Export credit target of 10 per cent introduced. 1993 Foreign banks target revised to 32 per cent and which includes export credit with sub targets of 10 per cent for export and 10 per cent for SSI. 1993 Target of 18 per cent for agriculture for Indian banks to include indirect advances to the extent of 4.5 per cent of Net Bank Credit. 1996 Export sub target raised from 10 to 12 per cent 1993 1998 Definition of priority sector enlarged to include
|
It is clear from the reforms introduced in the area that the scope of priority sector credit has been increased and provides opportunities to banks to make loans on commercially viable terms. There is no element of interest subsidy. Further, the markets have an option to invest short fall in priority sector lending in NABARD/SIDBI, thus exercising freedom not to lend to commercially unviable activities. Since banks have freedom to invest in bonds, debentures, shares etc., the resource base for calculating priority sector lending is restricted to advances, excluding expanding investments. |
|
Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
9. Ownership |
|
|
Currently out of 105 commercial banks (excluding Regional Rural banks), 27 are publicly owned. As per existing law governing Public Sector Banks, majority of public ownership should always be maintained. In the case of SBI the RBI shareholding cannot be less than 55% and for subsidiaries of SBI, SBI shareholding cannot go below 55%. In nationalised banks, the minimum Government shareholding has to be 51 per cent. Eight public sector banks have so far raised capital from the public. Public sector banks would require additional capital to meet their normal asset expansion as also the enhanced capital requirements and more stringent provisioning standards. The minimum public share of 55/51 per cent may become a constraining factor for some banks unless the Act is amended. |
Related issue is autonomy and inhibiting factors such as jurisdiction of vigilance, investigative agencies as long as there is majority of public ownership. Further, the public sector banks are governed by three different statues. Narasimham Committee recommended dilution of public ownership to 33 per cent. According to them the reduction of the minimum holding of Government below 51 per cent would in itself be a major and clear signal about the restoration to banks and financial institutions of autonomy in their functioning. |
Elements of |
Pre-reform status |
Reform measures |
Current status |
Comments/Outlook |
10. Legal and Institutional Reforms:
|
As per law banks can realise the securities pledged to them by filing a suit against the borrower and retain the pledged goods as collateral till the debts are satisfied or sell the goods by giving reasonable notice to the borrower without the intervention of the Court. The realisation of debts by filing a suit takes very long As regards selling the pledged goods by giving notice, very often banks do not have the goods in their possession as these are mostly inventories and are only hypothecated to the bank. In case of immovable properties, the law of mortgage is unsatisfactory as often the right of sale without the intervention of the Court is not available to banks/financial institutions.
|
|
|
|
Annexure II
STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF CORE PRINCIPLES OF BANKING SUPERVISION
Core Principle |
Implemented |
Partially Implemented |
Not Implemented |
Principle 1, Part 1 An effective system of banking supervision will have clear cut responsibilities and objectives for each agency involved in the supervision of banks. |
ü |
||
Principle 1, Part 2 Each such agency should possess operational independence and adequate resources. |
ü |
||
Principle 1, Part 3 A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also necessary including provisions relating to authorisation of banking establishments and their ongoing supervision |
ü |
||
Principle 1, Part 4. A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also necessary including powers to address compliance with laws as well as safety and soundness concerns |
ü |
||
Principle 1, Part 5. A suitable legal framework for banking supervision is also necessary including legal protection for supervisors. |
ü A working group setup by the RBI has examined this and concluded that while statutory protection is available for acts done in good faith, the liability of supervisors in case of negligence is yet to be tested in law. This will now be referred to the Expert Group set up by GOI to reexamine Banking related legislation. |
||
Principle 1, Part 6 Arrangements for sharing information between supervisors and protection for confidentiality of such information, should be in place. |
ü Interagency cooperation amongst supervisors has been examined by an inhouse group and the BFS has decided to refer their suggestions to GOI to set up a Technical Group on which major supervisors will be represented. It has also been suggested that a specific provision be incorporated in the Act authorising the Bank to share information with other supervisors. This will be looked into by the Expert Group setup by GOI. |
Core Principle |
Implemented |
Partially Implemented |
Not Implemented |
Principle 2, Part 1 The permissible activities of institutions that are Licensed and subject to supervision as banks must be clearly defined |
ü |
||
Principle 2, Part 2 the use of word 'bank' in names should be controlled as far as possible. |
ü |
||
Principle 3, Part 1 The Licensing authority must have the right to set criteria and reject applications of establishments that do not meet the standards set. |
ü |
||
Principle 3, Part 2 The Licensing process at minimum should consist of an assessment of the bank's ownership structure, directors and senior management; its operating plan and internal controls and its projected financial conditions, including its capital base. |
ü A Group was set up earlier this year to critically evaluate fulfillment of the objectives envisaged for the new banks set up in the private sector, examine the need for setting up new banks and suggest criteria for issuing Licenses in future. The issues raised here are also being looked into by this Group, |
||
Principle 3, Part 3 Where the proposed owner or parent organisation is a foreign bank, the prior consent of its home country supervisor should be obtained. |
ü |
||
Principle 4 Banking Supervision must have the authority to review and reject any proposals to transfer significant ownership or controlling interests in existing banks to other parties. |
üThis matter has been examined and it has been decided to refer this to the Expert Group which will be examining the Banking related Legislation. |
||
Principle 5, Part 1 Banking Supervision must have the authority to establish criteria for reviewing major acquisitions or investments by a bank |
ü |
||
Principle 5, Part 2 Banking Supervision must have the authority to establish criteria for ensuring that corporate affiliations or structures do not expose the bank to undue risks or hinder effective supervision. |
ü |
Core Principle |
Implemented |
Partially Implemented |
Not Implemented |
Principle 6, Part 1 Banking Supervisors must set minimum capital requirements for banks that reflect the risks that the banks undertake and must define the components of Capital bearing in mind its ability to absorb losses. |
ü |
||
Principle 6, Part 2 For internationally active banks these requirements should not be less than those established in the Basle Capital Accord. |
ü |
||
Principle 7, Part 1 As essential part of any supervisory system is the evaluation of a bank's policies and procedures related to the granting of loans and making of investments |
ü |
||
Principle 7, Part 2 As essential part of any supervisory system is the evaluation of a bank's policies and procedures related to ongoing management of the loan and investment portfolios. |
ü |
||
Principle 8, Part 1 Banking supervisors must be satisfied that banks establish and adhere to adequate policies practices and procedures for evaluating the quality of Assets |
ü |
||
Principle 8, Part 2 Banking supervisors must be satisfied that banks establish and adhere to adequate policies practices and procedures for evaluating adequacy of Loan Loss Provisions and Loan Loss Reserves . |
ü |
||
Principle 9, Part 1 Banking Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have Management Information Systems that enable management to identify concentrations within the portfolio |
ü |
||
Principle 9, Part 2 supervisors must set prudential limits to restrict bank exposures to single borrowers or groups of related borrowers. |
ü |
||
Principle 10, Part 1): In order to prevent abuses arising from connected lending, banking supervisors must have in place requirements that banks lend to related companies and individuals on arms-length basis, |
ü |
Core Principle |
Implemented |
Partially Implemented |
Not Implemented |
Principle 10, Part 2): In order to prevent abuses arising from connected lending, banking supervisors must have in place requirements that banks lend to related companies and individuals on arms-length basis that such extensions of credit are effectively monitored |
ü |
||
Principle 10, Part 3, In order to prevent abuses arising from connected lending, banking supervisors must have in place requirements that other appropriate steps are taken to control or mitigate the risks. |
ü |
||
Principle 11, Part 1 Banking Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have adequate policies and procedures for identifying monitoring and controlling country risk and transfer risk in their international lending and investment activities |
üThis issue was examined by the Risk Management Group which has made several recommendations. BFS has desired that the practice followed by different banks be studies and the recommendations resubmitted. |
||
Principle 11, Part 2 Banking Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have adequate policies and procedures for maintaining adequate reserves against such risks. |
üAlthough the Risk Management Group has made several recommendations regarding country risk, this particular aspect requires more detailed study. |
||
Principle 12, Part 1: Banking Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place systems that accurately control market risks; |
üBanks will now be required to provide Market Risk capital based on BIS standard methodology as a minimum requirement. |
||
Principle 12, Part 2 Supervisors should have powers to impose specific limits and/or a specific capital charge on market risk exposures if warranted. |
ü |
||
Principle 13 Banking Supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place a comprehensive risk management process (including appropriate Board and Senior Management oversight) to identify measures monitor and control all other material risks and where appropriate to hold capital against these risks. |
ü An in-house group has gone into the matter and made several recommendations regarding Risk Management structures and measures to be taken by banks. These will be communicated to banks for implementation. |
Core Principle |
Implemented |
Partially Implemented |
Not Implemented |
Principle 14, Part 1 Banking Supervisors must determine that banks have in place internal Controls that are adequate for the nature and scale of their business. |
ü |
|
|
Principle 14, Part 2 Banking Supervisors must determine that banks have in place internal Controls that are adequate for the nature and scale of their business. These should include clear arrangements for delegating authority and responsibility, separation of the functions that involve committing the bank, paying away its funds, and proper accounts for its assets and liabilities reconciliation of these processes; safeguarding its assets; and appropriate independent internal or external audit and compliance functions to test adherence to these controls as well as applicable laws and regulations. |
ü |
||
Principle 15, Banking Supervisors must determine that banks have adequate policies, practices and procedures in place including strict 'Know Your Customer' Rules that promote high ethical and professional standards in the financial sector and prevent the bank being used intentionally and unintentionally by criminal elements. |
ü |
||
Principle 16 An effective Banking Supervisory System should consist of some form of both on-site and off-site supervision. |
ü |
||
Principle 17 Banking Supervisors must have regular contact with bank Management and thorough understanding of the institution's operations. |
ü |
||
Principle 18, Part 1 Banking Supervisors must have means of collecting reviewing and analysing Prudential Reports and Statistical Returns from banks on a solo basis. |
ü |
||
Principle 18, Part 2 Banking Supervisors must have means of collecting reviewing and analysing Prudential Reports and Statistical Returns from banks on a consolidated basis. |
ü Consolidated Reporting by banks will be implemented after introduction of consolidated accounting which is being looked into by an inhouse group. |
Core Principle |
Implemented |
Partially Implemented |
Not Implemented |
Principle 19 Banking Supervisors must have a means of independent validation of supervisory information either through On-site Examination or use of External Auditors. |
ü |
||
Principle 20 An essential element of bank Supervision is the capability of the supervisors to supervise the banking group on a consolidated basis. |
üIntroduction of consolidated supervision is on the agenda of the Bank for implementation. An inhouse group is examining related issues. |
||
Principle 21, Part 1 Bank Supervisors must be satisfied that each bank maintains adequate records drawn up in accordance with consistent accounting policies and practices that enable the Supervisor to obtain a true and fair view of the financial condition of the bank and the profitability of its business |
ü |
||
Principle 21, Part 2 Bank Supervisors must be satisfied that the bank publishes on a regular basis Financial Statements that fairly reflect its condition. |
ü |
||
Principle 22 Banking Supervisors must have at their disposal adequate Supervisory measures to bring about timely corrective action when banks fail to meet prudential requirements such as minimum capital adequacy ratios when there are regulatory violations or where depositors are threatened in any other way. In extreme circumstances this should include the ability to revoke the banking licence or recommend its revocation |
ü |
||
Principle 23 Banking Supervisors must practice global consolidated supervision over their internationally active banks, adequately monitoring and applying appropriate prudential norms to all aspects of the business conducted by these banking organisations worldwide, primarily at their foreign branches, joint ventures and subsidiaries. |
ü The BFS has approved the proposals made by an inhouse group in this regard and these will be now implemented. |
Core Principle |
Implemented |
Partially Implemented |
Not Implemented |
Principle 24 A key component of Consolidated Supervision is establishing contact and information exchange with the various other Supervisors involved (primarily host-country Supervisory Authorities). |
üThe BFS has approved the proposals made by an in house group in this regard and these will be now implemented. |
||
Principle 25, Part 1 Banking Supervisors must require the local operations of foreign banks to be conducted to the same high standards as are required of domestic institutions . |
ü |
||
Principle 25, Part 2 Banking Supervisors must have powers to share information needed by the home country Supervisors of those banks for the purpose of carrying out consolidated Supervision. |
ü It has been suggested that a specific provision be incorporated in the Act authorising the Bank to share information with other supervisors. This will be looked into by the Expert Group set up by GOI. |
||
46 |
33 |
11 |
2 |
Annexure III
Accounting Standards as relevant to banks
A comparative analysis
Issue |
International Accounting Standard |
Indian Standard/Regulation as applicable to banks |
Comments |
1.Asset recognition and measurement: |
|||
I) Investments |
|||
a) Definition of current and permanent |
a) A Current investment is an investment that is by its nature readily realisable and is intended to be held for not more than one year.
|
a) As per international standard. |
In UK the investments are classified as current/non-current but in US there are three categories: (I) held to maturity for debt securities only (ii) available for sale and (iii) trading. |
b)Valuation |
b) Investments classified as current assets should be carried in the balance sheet at market value or the lower of cost or market value. The comparison of cost and market value can be performed either on an aggregate portfolio basis, in total or by category of investments, or on an individual investment basis.
|
b) For the purpose of valuation all investments other than permanent investments in Government and approved securities held as permitted by RBI has to be treated as current investments and marked to market. Banks have been advised by RBI to bifurcate all investments in approved and Government securities into current and permanent. The minimum ratio of current investments prescribed by RBI has been increased gradually from 30 percent to 70 percent for the year ending March 31 1999. RBI has already announced that in the next three years all the investments have to be treated as current. The valuation of current investments is done category wise. Any net gains under each category is ignored but losses have to be debited to Profit and Loss account under Provisions and Contingencies. If on valuation, there is an excess in the provision for depreciation account created by earlier debit to profit and loss account, it can be written back to profit and loss |
Current investments are valued at the lower of cost and net realisable value or at current cost. In US held to maturity securities should be held at amortised cost. Trading and available for sale securities should be measured at fair value. Gains and losses should be taken to income for trading securities but to shareholders' equity for available for sale securities. The Indian accounting standards laid down by RBI in consultation with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India is more conservative as |
Issue |
International Accounting Standard |
Indian Standard/Regulation as applicable to banks |
Comments |
If revalued amounts are used, a policy for the frequency of revaluation should be adopted and investments should be valued in entire categories. The resulting changes in carrying value can either be recognised through the income statement or adjusted on owners' equity as a revaluation surplus provided that the valuation is above cost. Any revaluation below cost is recognised as an expense in the income statement. The enterprise should recognise any decline in value below cost other than on a temporary basis on an item- by-item basis. |
account under the head 'provisions and contingencies' . However, such excess has to be transferred to Capital Reserve which is allowed to be treated as part of Tier II capital and cannot be used for distribution of dividend. In case of unquoted investments the value is to be determined on the basis of 'Yield to Maturity'. However the values have to be further discounted where interest or redemption are in arrears. Permanent investments can be held at book value. However, any premium paid has to be amortised over the life of the investment. Any discount has to be ignored. For the purpose of valuation, as stated above, banks are not allowed to treat more than 30 percent of their portfolio has permanent investment and progressively over the next three years the intention is that the full portfolio should be marked to market. |
banks cannot classify investments as permanent once the 100 percent mark to market is achieved. Further banks cannot recognise unrealised net gains as income. |
|
c) Fixed to current transfers |
c) In cases where current investments are carried at lower of cost and market, transfer has to be made at the lower of cost and carrying amount. Any revaluation reserve remaining after the transfer has to be reversed. Where current investments are carried at market, transfer carrying amount. Transfer any remaining revaluation reserve to income if the policy on current assets is to take gains and losses to income. |
c) Banks have to recognise the depreciation in the value of the investment when it is transferred to current category at the time of such transfer. |
|
d) Current to fixed transfers |
d) Transfer at lower of cost and market or at market if that was the basis used. |
d) the transfer will be at value net of depreciation. However, with banks moving to 100 percent mark to market such transfers will be few. |
Issue |
International Accounting Standard |
Indian Standard/Regulation as applicable to banks |
Comments |
ii) Lease accounting |
|
|
|
iii) Impairment of assets |
|
|
Issue |
International Accounting Standard |
Indian Standard/Regulation as applicable to banks |
Comments |
2. Liability recognition and measurement |
|||
i) Contingencies and events occurring after the balance sheet date |
|
|
The International Organisation of Securities Companies has called for a review of the measurement requirements of this standard as guidance is required to define more clearly the nature of contingencies. If this can be achieved the revised standard will provide a basis for distinguishing on-balance sheet.and off-balance sheet items. There is also a particular concern about the use of provisions in financial statements which will also be addressed when this standard will be reviewed |
ii) Income taxes |
|
|
Issue |
International Accounting Standard |
Indian Standard/Regulation as applicable to banks |
Comments |
|
iii) Employee benefits |
|
|
||
(iv) Financial instruments: Disclosure and Presentation |
|
|
||
3. Revenue Recognition |
|
|
||
4. Effects of changes in foreign exchange rates |
|
|
Issue |
International Accounting Standard |
Indian Standard/Regulation as applicable to banks |
Comments |
. |
|
||
5.Group accounting |
|
|
Issue |
International Accounting Standard |
Indian Standard/Regulation as applicable to banks |
Comments |
6. Disclosure and presentation International Accounting Standard 30 which specifically deals with disclosure in the financial statements of banks and other similar financial institutions |
|||
Income statement |
1. Accounting policies disclosure |
1. Accounting policies are disclosed |
|
2. Income statement: A bank should present an income statement which groups income and expenses by nature and discloses the amounts of the principal types of income and expenses |
2. income statement complies with international standard |
||
3. Income and expenses should not be offset except for those relating to hedges and to assets and liabilities where there is a legal right to set off and the offsetting represents the expectation as to the realisation or settlement of the asset or liability. |
3. IAS compliant |
||
Balance sheet |
4. a bank should present a balance sheet that groups assets and liabilities by nature and lists them in an order that reflects their relative liquidity. |
4. Assets listing reflects liquidity but not the liabilities. |
|
Investments |
5. a bank should disclose the market value of dealing securities and marketable investment securities if these values are different from the carrying amounts in the financial statements |
5. Market value of current investments is disclosed. Market value of permanent investments is not disclosed. |
|
6. the amount at which any asset or liability is stated in the balance sheet should not be offset by the deduction of another liability or asset unless a legal right of set-off exists and the offsetting represents expectation as to the realisation or settlement of the asset or liability. |
6. IAS compliant |
Issue |
International Accounting Standard |
Indian Standard/Regulation as applicable to banks |
Comments |
Contingencies and commitments |
7. a bank should disclose specified contingencies and commitments and events occurring after the balance sheet date as already stated above. |
7. IAS compliant as per assessment of external auditors |
|
Maturity pattern of assets and liabilities |
8. a bank should disclose an analysis of assets and liabilities into relevant maturity groupings based on the remaining period at the balance sheet date to the contractual maturity |
8. Banks are yet to build up information on maturity pattern. RBI has advised banks to put in place suitable systems to capture this information. |
|
Concentrations of assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet items |
9. a bank should disclose any significant concentrations of its assets liabilities and off balance sheet items. Such disclosures should be made in terms of geographical areas, customer or industry groups or other concentrations of risk. A bank should also disclose the amount of significant net foreign currency exposures. |
9. The banks disclose exposures to public sector priority sector Government and banks. Secured and unsecured exposures are also disclosed. |
|
Losses on loans and advances |
10. a bank should disclose the following in regard to losses on loans and advances:
|
10 The following disclosure is mandatory.
Indian regulations not IAS compliant. |
|
Related party |
11. .related party transactions should be disclosed |
11. Not disclosed. However, as per Banking Law, banks are prohibited from giving loans to companies/firms in which directors are interested |
Annexure IV
Money Market
Elements of Reform |
Pre-Reform Status |
Reform Status |
Current Status |
Comments/outlook |
1. Call/Notice/Term Money Market |
|
|
|
|
2. Commercial Paper |
|
|
|
|
Elements of Reform |
Pre-Reform Status |
Reform Status |
Current Status |
Comments/outlook |
3. Certificate of Deposits |
|
|
|
Rationalise the maturity structure of CDs. Rationalise stamp duty structure. Variation to instrument such as interest bearing CD and floating rate CD. |
4. Money Market Mutual Funds |
|
|
|
|
Elements of Reform |
Pre-Reform Status |
Reform Status |
Current Status |
Comments/outlook |
5. Commercial Bills Rediscounting |
|
|
|
Annexure V
Government Securities Market
Elements of Reform |
Pre-Reform Measures |
Reform Measures |
Current Status |
Comments/Outlook |
1. Policy |
|
|
|
|
2. Dated Government Securities |
|
|
|
|
Elements of Reform |
Pre-Reform Measures |
Reform Measures |
Current Status |
Comments/Outlook |
3. Treasury Bills |
|
|
|
|
4. Institutional Development |
|
|
|
Elements of Reform |
Pre-Reform Measures |
Reform Measures |
Current Status |
Comments/Outlook |
5. Primary Dealers |
|
|
|
|
6. Satellite Dealers |
|
|
|
|
7. Settlement System |
|
|
|
|
Elements of Reform |
Pre-Reform Measures |
Reform Measures |
Current Status |
Comments/Outlook |
8. Secondary Market Trading |
|
|
|
|
9. Inter-Bank Repos |
|
|
|
|
Elements of Reform |
Pre-Reform Measures |
Reform Measures |
Current Status |
Comments/Outlook |
10. RBI Repos |
|
|
|
|
11. Foreign Investment |
|
Non-Government Debt Market
Elements of Reform |
Pre-Reform Status |
Reform Measures |
Current Status |
Comments/ Outlook |
1. PSU Bonds |
|
|
|
|
2. Corporate Debt |
|
|
|
|
Elements of Reform |
Pre-Reform Status |
Reform Measures |
Current Status |
Comments/ Outlook |
Institutional Development |
|
|
|
Annexure VI
Foreign Exchange Market
Elements of Reforms |
Pre-Reform Status |
Reform Measures |
Current Status |
Comments/ Outlook |
1. Exchange |
|
|
|
- |
2. Overnight Positions/ Aggregate Gap Limits (AGL) of Authorised Dealers (ADs). |
Uniform limit of Rs 15 crore on the overnight positions of ADs. AGL not to exceed US $ 100 million or six times the net owned funds of a bank. |
|
|
- |
Elements of Reforms |
Pre-Reform Status |
Reform Measures |
Current Status |
Comments/ Outlook |
3. Cross Currency Options and derivative |
|
|
- |
- |
4. Foreign Currency Loans. |
|
Banks permitted in October 1996 to provide foreign currency denominated loans to their customers out of the pool of FCNR(B) deposits. |
- |
- |
Elements of Reforms |
Pre-Reform Status |
Reform Measures |
Current Status |
Comments/ Outlook |
5. Overseas borrowings/ |
Banks not permitted |
|
|
|
6. Forward Market |
|
|
|
|
Elements of Reforms |
Pre-Reform Status |
Reform Measures |
Current Status |
Comments/ Outlook |
7. Rupee based derivatives |
|
|
|
Rupee based derivatives would be developed further with the deepening of the forex market and the emergence of a stable rupee yield curve. |
8. Exchange Earners' Foreign Currency (EEFC) Account |
|
|
- |
The ultimate objective is to allow exporters and exchange earners to retain 100 per cent of their proceeds. |
* Keynote address by Dr. Y. V. Reddy, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India, at the Conference on "Growth, Governance and Empowerment: The Future of India's Economy" at University of California, Santa Cruz on November 20, 1998.
I am grateful to Mrs. Shyamala Gopinath and Dr. A.Prasad for their valuable assistance.
I am thankful to Mr. Malegam for his kind advice on accounting standards.
I am also thankful to Messrs D. Mohanty, M.S. Mohanty, and Dr. D. Ajit for background notes.